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ABSTRACT 
Current FCC regulation of the electromagnetic spectrum hinders the growth of 
wireless communication technology and fails to make efficient use of an extremely 
valuable asset.  Current policies have failed to keep pace with advancing technology and 
require a completely new allocation scheme in order to promote growth in the wireless 
communications industry.  This paper proposes a new allocation scheme for spectrum 
regulation that promotes competition in the marketplace in order to make the most 
effective use of the physical medium and eliminates unnecessary barriers to entry into the 
market to promote innovation.  Building upon fifty years of property-rights proposals for 
spectrum allocation, an understanding of the historical events that made regulation a 
necessity, and effects of liberalized policies in spectrum as well as other industries, led to 
the creation of an allocation scheme that takes full advantage of the competitive market 
and minimizes the detrimental effects from antiquated regulation policies.  A spectrum 
lease scheme grants full flexibility of use to leaseholders, yet still maintain minimal 
governmental control to ensure interference protection. 
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There is little doubt that the current regulation in wireless communications needs 
to be replaced with a more efficient system of allocation that promotes technology rather 
than hinders it.  It is not a new idea.  For fifty years, numerous people, with different 
backgrounds, have advocated implementation of a property-rights model for spectrum 
allocation.  Each proposal may differ in the details of implementing a property-rights 
scheme, but there is little doubt that implementing a property-rights allocation model for 
spectrum allocation will result in a more competitive market and efficient use of the 
available spectrum. 
The electromagnetic spectrum creates unique problems in wireless 
communications.  Initial use of the medium for transmission by the government and 
private industry resulted in a chaotic mess that required the government to regulate in 
order to make effective use of the available medium. 
The regulations have changed very little over the eighty years since their 
inception.  Our current regulation structure struggles to keep up with technology and far 
too often hinders the growth of the wireless communications industry. 
This paper draws upon the knowledge from decades of proposals, real world 
implementation of more liberal spectrum allocation schemes, and a model for successful 
deregulation to propose an allocation scheme of spectrum leases.  The lease scheme will 
maximize competition in the market and eliminate the unnecessary barriers to entry into 
the marketplace for new technologies and competition.  The proposal implements all the 
benefits of a property-rights scheme and includes an efficient administrative system to 
oversee allocation and dispute resolution.  The scheme makes more efficient use of the 
spectrum and promotes innovation. 
Chapters II through IV present background information for this proposal.  In 
Chapter II, the physical properties of the electromagnetic spectrum and some of the 
difficulties of wireless communications are discussed, as well as the history behind the 
events leading to the current form of wireless regulation in the United States.  Chapter III 
 2 
talks about the current form of spectrum regulation in the United States and details of 
some of the unintended consequences of the current form of regulation.  Chapter IV 
contains summaries of some of the leading proposals for adopting a new spectrum 
allocation scheme.  The first part lays out four proposals that represent over fifty years of 
opinions on the matter.  It also discusses the real world application of property-rights in 
Guatemala and El Salvador, as well as an analysis of the results as seen in the market.  
The final section of Chapter IV provides background information about the benefits of 
deregulation in other industries and lays out a blueprint for successful deregulation of 
future industries.  Chapter V details the proposed spectrum lease scheme, the 
administrative requirements, and interference resolution process.  Chapter VI illustrates 
the benefits of this proposed scheme versus the current regulations in the United States. 
There is very little doubt that the current spectrum regulations in the United States 
hinder the pace of advancement in the wireless communication industry.  Even the FCC 
acknowledges that they desire to implement a more efficient allocation scheme for 
spectrum and strive towards property-rights.  There is apprehension to completely turn 
the electromagnetic spectrum over to the open market.  This lease proposal satisfies all 
sides of the argument.  By leasing the spectrum, the government maintains overall control 
of the spectrum but permits full flexibility to leaseholders in order to take advantage of 
competition in the marketplace to most efficiently allocate the spectrum. 
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II. THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM AND INITIAL 
REGULATION 
The physical properties of electromagnetic energy must be understood in order to 
manage the allocation of spectrum.  Electromagnetic waves, of different wavelengths, 
will exhibit different propagation characteristics under identical conditions; similarly, the 
environmental conditions cause identical frequencies to act differently.  This chapter 
outlines some of the difficulties associated with the operating characteristics of the 
electromagnetic spectrum.  It also describes the events leading up to the government 
implementation of strict regulations over the broadcast industry and rationale for the 
decision by Congress to impose regulation. 
A. ELECTROMAGNETIC WAVE PROPAGATION 
Real world propagation of electromagnetic waves is difficult to predict.  Table 1 






3 - 30 kHz Very Low Frequency (VLF) Submarine Communications 
30 - 300 kHz Low Frequency (LF) Long Wave Radio 
300 kHz - 3 MHz  Medium Frequency (MF) Short/Medium Wave Radio 
3 - 30 MHz High Frequency (HF) FM Radio 
30 - 300 MHz Very High Frequency (VHF) Television 
300 MHz - 3 GHz 




3 - 30 GHz 
Super High Frequency 
(SHF) Satellite TV/Communications 
30 - 300 GHz 
Extremely High Frequency 
(EHF) – “millimeter wave” 
Point-to-Point Microwave and 
Satellite Communications 
Table 1.   Spectrum Bands and Applications 
Low frequency signals can be easily predicted and will travel between the Earth’s 
surface and the Ionosphere.  They are high power and low frequency transmissions that 
can propagate over long distances and penetrate water. 
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Waves in the frequency band, 300 kHz to 3 MHz travel in two paths:  ground 
waves and sky waves.  The propagation characteristics are affected by the time of day 
and weather. 
The frequency band from 3 MHz to 30 MHz is considered the shortwave region.  
Electromagnetic waves in this frequency band are affected by atmospheric conditions and 
solar activity. 
Very High Frequency (VHF) spectrum encompasses the frequencies from 30 
MHz through 300 MHz.  Technologies implemented in this frequency band consist of 
VHF television broadcast, FM radio, and mobile services.  Penetration of the waves into 
buildings is minimal and the lower range spectrum in this band is affected by conditions 
in the atmosphere. 
The frequency band from 300 MHz through 3 GHz is known as the Ultra-High 
Frequency (UHF) range.  This is considered the most desirable band of frequencies.  
Propagation characteristics of UHF waves allow it to penetrate into and around buildings.  
Directional antennas can be used to focus all the transmission energy in one direction to 
minimize interference and maximize transmission area.  UHF spectrum energy is not 
affected by changes in the climate.  However, signals in this range are affected by 
refraction through the atmosphere, diffraction around the edges of objects, and reflections 
off of obstacles.  The propagation of signals can only be predicted by statistical modeling 
since the effects of interference are not static.1  Energy will spill over into adjacent 
frequencies.  An early proponent of property-rights in spectrum noted that different bands 
of the spectrum had different propagation characteristics and may require a different set 
of rules. 
The propagation of radio waves is affected by the atmosphere, the 
ionosphere, the curved surface of the Earth, and even mountains, 
buildings, fields, deserts, and oceans.  Since these effects vary widely 
                                                 
1 Philip Weiser and Dale Hatfield.  “Spectrum Policy Reform and the Next Frontier of Property 
Rights.”  George Mason Law Review 15.3 (2008): 580. 
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depending upon frequency, some ranges of frequencies may require 
different forms of property arrangements.2 
1. Geographic Spillover 
 Radio waves propagate in a manner that is difficult to predict with certainty.  The 
signals cannot be fenced in and will travel indefinitely through space.  Reception of the 
signal is limited by the dissipation of the energy as the signal moves away from its point 
source and the interference and noise present at the receiver.  The electromagnetic energy 
emitted does not recognize or obey arbitrary boundaries and react to the dynamic 
properties of our atmosphere. 
 The figures below show an example of how different electromagnetic energy 
propagates from predicted models and in reality.  Figure 1 represents the predicted range 
of transmission of energy from a broadcast tower in Denver, CO. 
                                                 
2 Arthur S. De Vany, Ross Eckert, Charles Meyers, and Richard Scott.  “A Property System for Market 
Allocation of the Electromagnetic Spectrum:  A Legal-Economic-Engineering Study.”  Stanford Law 




Figure 1.   Predicted Propagation Model3 
The waves do not behave ideally.  In reality they are affected by the atmosphere, 
geography, and manmade structures.  Figure 2 illustrates the actual behavior of the 
transmitted waves from the same tower modeled above.  The FCC initially established 
overly conservative geographic boundaries to eliminate the chance of interference with 
other emitting systems. 
                                                 
3 Philip Weiser and Dale Hatfield.  “Spectrum Policy Reform and the Next Frontier of Property 
Rights.”  George Mason Law Review 15.3 (2008):  585. 
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Figure 2.   Actual Propagation Behavior4 
2. Adjacent Channel Spillover 
Interference in the adjacent channel results from transmissions of energy outside 
the prescribed bandwidth and inadequate filtering by receivers.  Initial regulation by the 
FCC created large buffer zones between spectrum bands to eliminate the risk of 
interference from adjacent channels.  Their regulations failed to keep pace with advances 
in transmitter and receiver performance that make more efficient use of the available 
electromagnetic spectrum. 
                                                 
4 Philip Weiser and Dale Hatfield.  “Spectrum Policy Reform and the Next Frontier of Property 
Rights.”  George Mason Law Review 15.3 (2008):  586. 
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B. PATH TO INITIAL REGULATION 
1. Early Lobbying for Regulation 
The first attempt to lobby Congress for spectrum regulation was made by the 
United States Navy in 1910.  The Secretary of the Navy attempted to prove to Congress 
that broadcast conditions created by an independently operated radio station transmitting 
electromagnetic waves, as desired, would lead to a chaotic condition.  This would hinder 
public business and possibly interfere with distress signals.  Additionally, he pointed out 
that standards were lacking and behavior by the operators was unethical, by sending out 
false signals or false identification.  He said, “It is not putting the case too strongly to 
state the situation is intolerable, and is continually growing worse.”5 
Congress passed the first Act regulating electromagnetic use of the airwaves on 
August 13, 1912.  All operators were required to have a license, issued by the Secretary 
of Commerce, in order to operate.  The license detailed the location, the authorized 
wavelengths, and the specific hours of permissible operation.  Following the sinking of 
the Titanic, it required ships to carry equipment capable of emergency transmission.6  An 
amateur spectrum band of wavelengths less than 200 meters was established, but 
wavelengths between 600 and 1,600 meters required a commercial license.7 
In 1917, the Secretary of the Navy, Joseph Daniels, lobbied Congress for 
exclusive ownership of all wireless communication.  He explained that radio was, “the 
only method of communication which must be dominated by one power to prevent 
interference…  The question of interference does not come in at all in the matter of cables 
or telegraph but only in wireless.”8  Because of the unique nature of wireless 
communication, he believed that one government agency or corporation could only 
                                                 
5 Ronald H. Coase.  “The Federal Communications Commission.”  The Journal of Law and 
Economics.  October 1959:  3. 
6 Bert Lundy.  Telegraph, Telephone and Wireless:  How Telecom Changed the World.  Charleston, 
SC:  Booksurge, 2008:  507. 
7 Coase:  3. 
8 Ibid. 
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accomplish effective regulation.  The responsibility could not be shared.  His attempts to 
lobby Congress for control of the spectrum failed. 
2. Boom of the Broadcast Industry 
In March 1920, Richard Sarnoff, the President of the Radio Corporation of 
America (RCA), wrote that, “It would seem reasonable to expect sales of $1,000,000 
‘Radio Music Boxes’ at $75 each within a period of three years.”9  In March of 1922, 
there were 60 broadcasting stations in the United States.  Six months later, there were 
564.10  “In the three year period, 1922-1924, RCA’s sales of home radios were 
$83,500,000, slightly exceeding Sarnoff’s prediction.”11 
3. Chaotic Regulation:  1922-1927 
Herbert Hoover served as Secretary of Commerce from March 5, 1921 through 
August 21, 1928.12  Hoover conducted annual radio conferences and consistently lobbied 
Congress for improved regulations.  He was unsuccessful at getting an improved 
regulation framework passed into law so he regulated according to the powers granted in 
the Act of 1912.  There were two lawsuits during the 1920s that effectively removed the 
authority of the Secretary of Commerce to regulate the airwaves:  the Intercity Radio 
Company lawsuit and the Zenith Radio Corporation case. 
In 1921, Secretary Hoover declined a license renewal request for the Intercity 
Radio Company.  The company challenged the ruling in court.  The court ruled that the 
Secretary had no authority to refuse licenses and therefore had no control over the  
 
 
                                                 
9 Bert Lundy.  Telegraph, Telephone and Wireless:  How Telecom Changed the World.  Charleston, 
SC:  Booksurge, 2008:  498. 
10 Ronald H. Coase.  “The Federal Communications Commission.”  The Journal of Law and 
Economics.  October 1959:  4. 
11 Lundy:  498. 
12 “Secretaries.”  The United States Department of Commerce.  5 March 2009.  10 March 2009 
<http://www.commerce.gov/About_Us/Secretaries/index.htm>. 
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number of stations established in the United States.  The wording of the ruling implied 
that the Secretary of Commerce did not possess the authority to specify the wavelengths 
that a licensee could use.13 
In 1925, Secretary Hoover issued extremely restrictive rights to the Denver, 
Colorado affiliate of the Zenith Radio Corporation.  He issued a license that allowed the 
affiliate to transmit a wavelength of 332.4 meters, only between 10:00pm and midnight, 
and only on Thursdays when General Electric was not using the band.14  Zenith violated 
the restrictive license and challenged the restrictions in court.  In April 1926, a court 
ruled that, “the Act did not give the Secretary of Commerce power to make regulations 
and that he was required to issue a license subject only to the regulations of the Act 
itself.”15 
Secretary Hoover interpreted the results of both cases to be conflicting and 
requested the Attorney General rule on clarification.  “The Secretary of Commerce was 
compelled to issue licenses to anyone who applied, and the licensees were then free to 
decide on the power of their station, its hours of operation, and the wavelength they 
would use.”16  The ruling led to complete chaos in broadcasting.  Over 200 broadcasting 
stations were established in a nine-month period and Congress was forced to act. 
C. THE BIRTH OF MODERN REGULATION 
1. The Federal Radio Commission 
The chaotic broadcast industry that resulted following the Attorney General ruling 
forced Congress to pass legislation to avoid interference between competing users of the 
spectrum.  Both houses came to an agreement on a new communications regulation in 
                                                 
13 Ronald H. Coase.  “The Federal Communications Commission.”  The Journal of Law and 





December of 1926.  The Act was signed in February of 1927 and established a new 
regulating body for wireless communications:  the Federal Radio Commission.17 
The Commission was granted total power to regulate all aspects of the wireless 
spectrum.  It was given the authority to classify radio stations, prescribe the nature of 
service, assign wavelengths, determine power limits and locations of transmitters, 
regulate equipment use, and create a set of rules to eliminate interference.  All broadcast 
license requests were to be made to the Federal Radio Commission. 
The wording of the 1927 Act provided the Commission with broad power to 
regulate the wireless spectrum.  The law permitted that the Commission, 
May prescribe as to the citizenship, character, and financial, technical, and 
other qualifications of the applicant to operate the station; the ownership 
and location of the proposed station and of stations, if any, with which it is 
proposed to communicate; the frequencies or wave lengths to be used; the 
hours of the day or other periods of time during which it is proposed to 
operate the station; the purposes for which the station is to be used, and 
such other information as it may require.18 
The Commission took swift action to restore order in the communications 
industry.  “One of the first actions which the new Radio Commission took was to reduce 
the number of stations broadcasting on the air.  In 1928, 162 broadcasters were 
challenged to prove that their broadcasting rights should not be continued.  The majority 
took their cases to court, but several went off the air.”19 
2. The Federal Communications Commission 
The FCC was created by an act of Congress on June 19, 1934.20  The powers of 
the Federal Radio Commission were absorbed by the newly formed FCC, which also 
                                                 
17 Ronald H. Coase.  “The Federal Communications Commission.”  The Journal of Law and 
Economics.  October 1959:  5. 
18 Ibid., 6. 
19 Bert Lundy.  Telegraph, Telephone and Wireless:  How Telecom Changed the World.  Charleston, 
SC:  Booksurge, 2008:  508. 
20 Fritz Messere.  “The FCC.”  Museaum of Broadcast Communications.  8 January 2009 
<http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/F/htmlF/federalcommu/ federalcommu.htm>. 
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became responsible for regulating the telephone and telegraph industries.  The 
Telecommunications Act of 1934 allowed for the extensive regulation of the airwaves 
that continues today.  “The Commission was given the broad latitude to establish a rapid, 
efficient, nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service.”21 
The FCC originally contained three divisions to handle broadcast, telephone, and 
telegraph.  It merged responsibilities from the Federal Radio Commission, the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, and the Postmaster General.  The FCC now regulates new 
technologies, including satellite, microwave, and private radio.  Section 303 of the Act 
gave the FCC, “the power to classify stations and prescribe services, assign frequencies 
and power, approve equipment and mandate standards for levels of interference, make 
regulations for stations with network affiliations, prescribe qualifications for station 
owners and operators, levy fines and forfeitures, and issue cease and desist orders.”22 
Over the course of the FCC existence, there has been no consistent pattern of 
decision-making, which impacts their credibility to enforce fair regulation.  Early on, 
decisions favored business over educational or community interests.  They also have 
made decisions over the years that have been critical of corporations. 
3. Modern View of FCC Regulation 
Economist Ronald Coase rejected the belief that the FCC acts in the best interest 
of the public.  He argued that the finiteness of spectrum should not be the reason to 
regulate.  On the contrary, most scarce resources were allocated privately in the 
marketplace and that spectrum would be best allocated through the price mechanism in 
the marketplace. 
Former FCC Chief Economist Thomas Hazlett asserts that the regulatory regime 
was put in place because of bad motives and not bad reasoning, as Coase reasoned.  
Lawmakers were aware of the property-rights model, but rejected it to protect their own 
self-interests.  “Hazlett maintains that these lawmakers sought to place themselves at the 
                                                 
21 Fritz Messere.  “The FCC.”  Museaum of Broadcast Communications.  8 January 2009. 
22 Ibid. 
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‘nexus of decision making in a brisk competitive rivalry for zero-priced frequency rights’ 
and thus to provide themselves with ‘a very well understood discretion over the life and 
death of lucrative and influential broadcasters.’”23 
Two former students of Thomas Hazlett presented the most logical explanation 
behind the reasoning of Congress to implement strict regulations over the wireless 
communications industry.  David Moss and Michael Fein contend that it was not flawed 
analysis or deceptive analysis that led to regulation, but fear of the power that broadcast 
ability would provide.  “Given the (apparent) reality of a limited radio spectrum and the 
extraordinary political influence that the right to broadcast seemed to convey, federal 
lawmakers turned fiercely against a market solution.”24 
Politicians in the 1920s feared monopolization of the broadcast industry and the 
concentration of power in a small number of people.  Unethical tactics used by 
broadcasters in the 1920s led the politicians to fear the possibility of an unregulated 
spectrum and the inability to regain control if the industry was left to the open market.  
Representative Luther A. Johnson summed up the political fear by saying, “There is no 
agency so fraught with possibilities for service of good or evil to the American people as 
the radio.”25 
The three arguments take different viewpoints on the reasons for Congress to 
enact the initial regulation of the wireless spectrum.  Coase contends that it was flawed 
logic.  Hazlett believes lawmakers framed the case deceptively in order to keep power, 
and Moss and Fein contend that there was legitimate fear of allowing free reign for 
broadcasters in the late 1920s.  The three viewpoints present logical explanations for the 
government to enact spectrum regulation in 1927.  However, the reasoning used to 
support regulation is no longer valid today. 
Economically, spectrum regulations have created unnecessary obstacles for 
implementing new technology.  Unlike in the 1920s, the electromagnetic spectrum can no 
                                                 
23 Michael R. Fein and David A. Moss.  “Radio Regulation Revisited:  Coase, the FCC, and the Public 
Interest.”  The Journal of Political History 15.4 (2003):  396. 
24 Ibid., 391. 
25 Ibid., 401. 
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longer be looked at as a finite source for broadcasters.  Alternative means for transmitting 
information, better transmitting and receiving technologies, and more efficient techniques 
that better utilize the available spectrum make it nearly impossible for a small number of 
people to concentrate resources in order to monopolize the political viewpoint that is 
transmitted to the people of the United States.  There is no need to maintain the current 
regulative power over today’s wireless communications industry. 
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The varying propagation characteristics of the electromagnetic spectrum provide 
unique challenges to the implementation of an effective management structure.  Initial 
attempts by the wireless communications industry, with loosely implemented regulations, 
to make effective use of the airwaves resulted in chaos. 
The response by the government was to enact firm regulations imposed by a 
powerful bureaucratic government agency.  However, what resulted was the 
establishment of an orderly wireless communications industry.  Over the years, issues 
with the FCC and their regulation decisions have led to calls for reform.  The guidelines 
for the initial spectrum regulation remain today and the rapid growth of recent wireless 
technologies has exposed the need for modernization of the current spectrum regulations. 
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III. SPECTRUM REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
Due to the physical properties of the electromagnetic spectrum and history of the 
industry, regulation in wireless communication is much different than in other 
technologies.  Regulation plays a much more important role.  The resource is shared as 
everyone has access to the broadcast medium.  In the 1920s, a lack of knowledge and 
coordination in the industry led to chaos, which led to the strict regulation that exists 
today.  This chapter explains how spectrum is regulated today, identifies the FCC’s future 
goals for spectrum regulation, and highlights some examples of the shortcomings of the 
current model of regulation. 
A. SPECTRUM REGULATION AGENCIES 
Three agencies regulate the spectrum.  The International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU) implements international spectrum policies as a sanctioned organization of 
the United Nations since 1946.26  The United States is a member.  In the United States, 
responsibility for spectrum management is divided between two agencies:  the FCC and 
the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA).  The FCC 
handles regulation of the commercial wireless communications industry and the NTIA 
coordinates government use of the spectrum. 
The ITU is a specialized treaty organization of the United Nations.  The 
participants of the ITU meet in the World Radio Conference.  Participation in the ITU by 
the United States is coordinated through the Department of State.27  The FCC administers 
spectrum regulation for non-federal use of the wireless spectrum.  This includes state and 
local governments, commercial wireless industry, private business and personal use.  The 
NTIA operates under the Department of Commerce and administers all access to the 
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27 Michael J. Marcus.  “Wireless Communication Standards and Regulations.”  Presentation at IEEE 
Workshop, Phoenix, AZ.  2004. 
 16 
wireless spectrum for federal use.28  This includes the use of the spectrum by federal 
agencies such as the Department of Defense, the Federal Aviation Administration, and 
the Federal Bureau of Investigations. 
B. FCC REGULATION 
1. Regulations 
Regulation and enforcement of FCC spectrum policies has traditionally been 
handled by the command-and-control structure of the FCC.  The FCC makes the rules, 
enforces the rules, and adjudicates disputes.  Prior to the early 1990s, an FCC panel 
decided who would be granted licenses to broadcast in the wireless spectrum.  Currently, 
the FCC uses an auction scheme to distribute licenses to broadcast in the wireless 
spectrum.  The FCC has all authority over radio use in the United States except for 
government use.  All policies are available for review and available through a process of 
public notice and comment, which allows the public to view policies and make comment 
prior to the Commission instituting the policy. 
The Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) handle all rules concerning the 
wireless spectrum within the FCC.  The OET provides technical advice on spectrum 
issues and maintains the Frequency Allocation Table.  Allocated frequency licenses, 
between 9 kHz and 275 GHz, are maintained within the OET. 
The Frequency Allocation Table is a compilation of all allocations by the FCC.  It 
lists all primary and secondary services within each allocated spectrum band.  Secondary 
services operate in the same allocated bands as primary services allowing for more 
efficient use of allocated bands.  A secondary licensee shall not cause harmful 
interference to primary services and receives no guarantee of protection from interference 
from primary license holders; however, they are protected from interference from other 
secondary licensees.  The OET not only maintains the current allocation table of licensed 
frequencies but also maintains the history of tables and reports by the FCC. 
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The Federal Communications Commission. 
 17 
2. Auctions 
Since 1994, the FCC has used an auction scheme for allocating spectrum to new 
users.  The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 authorized the FCC to auction 
licenses to new bands of spectrum.29  Any company or individual that is deemed eligible 
by the Commission can participate in the open auctions that are conducted over the 
Internet.  The FCC believes that auctions provide the most efficient mechanism of 
spectrum allocation and reduces the required time to successfully acquire a broadcast 
license. 
a. Background 
For the first fifty years of government spectrum regulation, licenses were 
awarded based on Commission hearings.  Eventually, the increased demand for licenses 
overwhelmed the slow allocation process.  In 1982, the FCC initiated a lottery system for 
spectrum allocation. 
The lottery placed no restrictions on participation.  The Commission 
believed that a secondary market for awarded licenses would allow the 
telecommunications companies to sort out the licenses amongst themselves.  The lottery 
system did not perform as intended and the Commission received constant scrutiny about 
the process from Congress.  Under the lottery process, a group of dentists, with no 
intention of using the spectrum, was awarded a license for cellular services on Cape Cod.  
The group sold the license to Southwestern Bell for $41 million.30 
Members of Congress recognized the value of spectrum licenses.  Pressure 
from legislators forced the FCC to research and implement a more fair and profitable 
method for allocating spectrum licenses.  The FCC consulted with game theorists and 
mathematicians in order to create an auction scheme that was fair to everyone involved in 
                                                 
29 “About Auctions.”  The Federal Communication.  9 August 2006. 
30 Erica Klareich, Kenneth Arrow, Robert Aumann, John McMillan, Paul Milgrom, Roger Myerson, 
and Thomas Schelling.  “The Bidding Game.”  National Academy of the Sciences, Beyond Discovery:  The 
Path from Research to Human Benefit.  (March 2003):  6. 
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the auction process.  “Auctions, which tend to award the prize to the bidder who values it 
most and to extract a lot of money along the way, seemed like the way to go.”31 
The idea of auctioning of spectrum was not well received by the wireless 
communications industry.  They did not believe that the new allocation scheme would see 
the results as predicted by the FCC and Congress.  “The Federal Communications 
Commission estimated that the airwave spectrum was worth about $10 billion, but 
telecommunications industry leaders scoffed at the idea that they would pay anywhere 
near that sum.”32 
The first auction of wireless broadcast licenses occurred in July of 1994 at 
the Omni Shoreham Hotel in Washington, D.C.33  Bidding for the first ten licenses 
increased by the tens of millions of dollars to a cost of $617 million for the first ten small 
licenses.  By 2001, auctions of wireless spectrum had netted the United States 
Department of the Treasury approximately $42 billion.34 
The FCC’s policy of auctioning spectrum licenses was a great success.  
Not only did it provide a mechanism for the government to collect revenue from 
spectrum use, but also it created a more efficient process for companies to introduce new 
technologies into the consumer telecommunications market.  “Within two years of the 
first spectrum auctions, wireless phones based on the new technologies were on the 
market.”35 
b. Bidding 
Currently, the auction process is conducted in multiple rounds and 
continues until there is no change in bids for one round of bidding.  Simultaneous Multi-
Round Bidding (SMR) allows for bidders to see the results of each round of bidding and 
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adapt their bidding strategy based on accurate demand information.  The process also 
allows for package bidding so a user can bid for multiple licenses in one spectrum in 
order to minimize the awarding of chunks of spectrum that cannot be used for its 
intended purpose. 
(1)  Simultaneous Multi-Round (SMR) Bidding. SMR bidding 
makes all licenses available for simultaneous bidding.  “Simultaneity provides buyers 
with information about the prices of relevant complements and substitutes, and allows 
them to act on information to combine complementary spectrum into the most efficient 
packages and to choose among suitable spectrum.”36  Following the conclusion of each 
round of bids, the Commission posts results on the Internet.  The SMR process provides 
feedback about the value of licenses being auctioned to the bidders.  This process of 
auctioning spectrum continues for an undefined number of rounds.  Bidding continues 
until a round of bidding is completed without a change in bids.37 Without simultaneity, a 
bidder could end up not bidding on an item early because they overestimate the price of 
the other desired item to be auctioned later or they could win the earlier item at a high bid 
and not have enough capital available to win the auction for the other spectrum. 
(2)  Package Bidding. The FCC allows bidders to bid on multiple 
licenses in a bundled package.  “Package bidding is appropriate when there are strong 
complementaries among licenses for some bidders and the pattern of those 
complementaries varies among bidders.  Under these circumstances, package bidding 
yields an efficient outcome, ensuring the licenses are sold to those bidders who value 
them most.”38  Package bidding allows for a bidder to bid on the entire amount of 
spectrum desired and win all-or-nothing and, “facilitates efficient aggregation of 
spectrum across geography ad bandwidth.”39  For example, a group of spectrum may be 
worth a certain amount if both are available.  However, without their compliment, they 
                                                 
36 Evan Kwerel and John Williams.  “A Proposal for a Rapid Transition to Market Allocation of 
Spectrum.”  Federal Communications Commission, OPP Working Paper Series 38 (2002):  11. 
37 “About Auctions.”  The Federal Communication.  9 August 2006. 
38 Ibid. 
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are not worth as much separately.  Without package bidding, a bidder may win part of the 
desired spectrum at a higher cost than the actual value of that piece. 
c. Auction Timeline 
Table 2 outlines the FCC’s auction process from announcement of the 
available licenses to the public notice of auction winners of licenses. 
Time Action 
  
Public notice is released announcing auction 
     -seeking public comment on procedures 
     -in accordance with the Budget Act of 1997 
4-6 Months Prior 
  
  
Second public notice is released by the FCC 
     -announces terms, procedures, and conditions 
3-5 Months Prior 
  
  
Seminar is held by the FCC 
     -introduces auction rules and processes 
     -answers questions from potential bidders 
60-75 Days Prior 
  
  
Short Form Application is due to the FCC 
     -required for participation in the auction 
     -contains pertinent company information 
     -intention of desired licenses 
45-60 Days Prior 
  
  
Applicants notified of the status of their application 
     -accepted, incomplete, or rejected 
30-40 Days Prior 
  
  
Short Form Application resubmission 
     -incomplete applications 
Deposit of funds by potential bidders 
     -funds available for auction 
3-4 Weeks Prior 
  
  
FCC releases notice of qualified bidders 
     -desired licenses and available capital for bids 
     -information sent to each applicant 
10-14 Days Prior 
  
  
Auction registration for qualified applicants 1 Week Prior 
     -FCC distributes all tools necessary for auction 
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Mock auction is conducted 
     -verifies participants are familiar with the process 
2-5 Days Prior 
  
  
Auction is held by the FCC over the Internet Auction Day 
  
  
FCC publishes public notice of results 
     -winning bid and amount owed 
     -10 days to fulfill payment requirement 
Post Auction 
  
Table 2.   Auction Timeline40 
C. SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE (SPTF) 
In 2002, the FCC launched the SPTF, “to assist the Commission in identifying 
and evaluating changes in spectrum policy that will increase the public benefits derived 
from the use of radio spectrum.”41  Chairman Michael K. Powell issued a statement 
outlining the need for regulators to keep pace with the rapidly advancing wireless 
technologies. 
The government has an almost impossible task of trying to keep pace with 
the ever-increasing demand for spectrum and continuing advances in 
wireless technologies and applications.  In the fast-moving world, the 
Commission cannot rely on outmoded procedures and policies.  We must 
establish new ways to support innovations and the efficient, flexible use of 
spectrum.  While the Spectrum Policy Task Force has a difficult task 
ahead of it, I am pleased that it is making significant progress and that it is 
moving forward with a work plan.42 
The Task Force was comprised of senior staff from multiple commissions and 
bureaus and offices.  Among its participants were included engineers, attorneys, and 
economists. 
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The SPTF Report stated that to “increase opportunities for technologically 
innovative and economically efficient spectrum use, spectrum policy must evolve 
towards more flexible and market-oriented regulatory models.”43  Its aim was to 
modernize the policies of how spectrum resources are allocated and utilized. 
The Task Force issued their report in November of 2002.  It issued three principal 
recommendations for future wireless spectrum allocation: 
(1) Migrate from current command and control model for spectrum 
regulation to market-oriented, exclusive-rights and unlicensed 
device/commons models; 
(2) Implement ways to increase access to spectrum in all dimensions for 
users of both unlicensed devices and licensed spectrum; and 
(3) Implement a new paradigm for interference protection.44 
The SPTF Report detailed three specific approaches for implementing more 
market-oriented schemes for allocation of the utility:  exclusive-use, commons, and 
command and control.  Exclusive-use allows for, “exclusive and transferrable flexible use 
rights for the specified spectrum within a defined geographic area; technical rules 
primarily govern those rights to protect spectrum users against interference.”45  The 
commons approach to spectrum allocation provides an unlimited number of unlicensed 
users to, “share frequencies; technical standards or etiquette governs usage right, but 
there are no rights to protection from interference.”46  The command and control model is 
the traditional model of FCC spectrum regulation in the United States.  “It limits 
allowable uses based on regulatory judgment.”47 
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The objectives of the Task Force were to encourage the best use of the spectrum 
to promote growth, rapid deployment of innovative and efficient technologies in 
communication, ensure efficient use of the spectrum, and to promote transparency and 
awareness in spectrum activities.  Additionally, the Task Force sought future input from 
experts and to collaborate with all disciplines and institutions to improve upon SPTF 
recommendations and implement future ideas.48  Some of the implementation of the Task 
Force policies focused on future FCC initiatives, including removing secondary barriers 
to implementation of spectrum policies through authorized leasing and transfer of unused 
portions of licenses, additional spectrum for unlicensed use, additional rural access to 
wireless communications technologies, and additional studies of receiver performance to 
make more efficiently use of the electromagnetic spectrum. 
One year after the report was issued, the FCC reported on the progress towards 
implementation of Task Force initiatives.  In that first year, the FCC worked towards 
improving access to spectrum in rural areas, specified immunity performance standards 
for radio receivers, established an interference temperature metric, designated additional 
spectrum for unlicensed use, and issued a final set of rules for establishing secondary 
markets.  The Task Force encouraged the FCC to seek input from consumers and 
companies, using technology, regarding future policies.  The Commission would seek 
input through public workshops, actively seeking comments on issued reports, and 
through a SPTF web site. 
In 2006, the FCC’s Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (WTB) repeated the 
Task Force’s goals of further advancement in improved spectrum allocation.  At the FCC, 
the WTB is 
responsible for all FCC domestic wireless telecommunications programs 
and policies, except those involving satellite, public safety 
communications, and broadcasting.  Wireless communications include 
cellular, paging, broadband PCS, advanced wireless services, 700 MHz, 
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broadband radio service/educational broadband service, microwave, 
amateur radio, and air-ground radiotelephone service.49 
According to the WTB 2006 agenda, their mission is to, “promote competition, 
efficiency, and innovation in the wireless marketplace for the benefit of consumers and 
the advancement of commercial, private, and public safety operations.”50  The WTB 
points to performance metrics in the wireless communications industry to support their 
claim that initiatives established by the SPTF have led to improved use of the 
electromagnetic spectrum.  Over a five-year period, from 2001 through 2005, the WTB 
claims that wireless communications markets in the United States saw an increase of 
101% in the number of wireless subscribers, 126% increase in revenue, 41% increase in 
the number of jobs in the industry, and a 182% increase in the number of minutes of use 
by subscribers.  Additionally, costs to make a wireless call decreased by 8 cents per 
minute.51  Because of the successes of the industry, the WTB encouraged future growth 
through more auctions and use of unlicensed spectrum bands. 
Following five years of increased focus on the commons approach to wireless 
spectrum allocation and more auctions, the FCC stopped progress towards completely 
implementing the SPTF initiatives.  In 2007, the Commission halted all further progress 
towards achieving more market-based allocation of spectrum in wireless 
communications.  The agency effectively ignored the “increasing dissatisfaction with the 
current approach to spectrum management which suppresses competitive entry, blocks 
efficient transfer of spectrum to higher value use, and insulates old technologies from 
innovative challenge.”52  Although they have not fully implemented the 
recommendations of the SPTF, the FCC has re-stated that one of its goals is to implement 
innovative licensing models in order to eliminate barriers to competition in the wireless 
communications market. 
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D. FCC STRATEGIC PLAN (2009-2014) 
The FCC has established six strategic areas of emphasis for the next five years.  
These goals are to make improvements in the following areas:  broadband, competition, 
spectrum, media, public safety, and modernization of the FCC. 
The FCC aims to ensure that all Americans should have affordable access to 
reliable broadband services.  “Regulatory policies must promote technological neutrality, 
competition, investment, and innovation to ensure that broadband service providers have 
sufficient incentive to develop and offer such products and services.”53  More 
competition in the market is beneficial to the domestic and international economies.  The 
Commission urges more competition in all aspects of their regulated industries through 
better and more efficient regulations.  In media, the FCC promotes competition, diversity, 
and localism.  An additional emphasis is placed on the transition to all digital media 
delivery.  The Commission hopes to create a critical infrastructure that is reliable and 
available during all crises and emergencies.  The last goal is the overall modernization of 
the FCC.  “The FCC shall strive to be a highly productive, adaptive, and innovative 
organization that maximizes the benefit to stakeholders, staff, and management from 
effective systems, processes, resources, and organizational culture.”54  The focused areas 
of competition and spectrum are important to future improvements in an improved 
system of spectrum allocation. 
1. Competition 
Competition in communications directly supports the national economy.  Over the 
next five years, the FCC aims to foster sustainable competition across the entire 
communications sector and greater promotion of universal services.  Their method for 
implementing more competition in the communications sector includes establishing rules 
that promote open and through competitive entry and through consistent enforcement of 
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regulatory framework.  They also emphasize promotion of universal services, which will 
allow greater access to resources at affordable rates.55 
2. Spectrum 
The Commission has established a rigorous set of goals for spectrum strategy.  
Implementation depends upon an increased emphasis on flexible allocation policies that 
promote efficient and effective use of the spectrum.  The Commission plans on advancing 
the utilization of spectrum for unlicensed use and improving the common Commission 
goal of timely and effective regulation. 
Several steps are identified toward achieving more efficient and effective use of 
the spectrum.  The Commission plans to achieve this through an increased number of 
spectrum bands available for shared use by compatible technologies, new and innovative 
licensing models that reduce entry barriers to competition, improved interoperability for 
public safety, minimization of harmful interference, and encouraging new technologies.  
The FCC identifies improving effective and timely licensing activities as a means 
to achieving improved spectrum allocation.  To this end, they propose utilizing electronic 
technologies for faster filing of documents with the Commission and information sharing 
regarding regulations.  A goal is to further advance opportunities for new uses of 
spectrum resources while minimizing harmful interference.  Vigorous enforcement of 
policies is necessary to ensure full compliance with all spectrum regulations. 
E. CURRENT REGULATION ISSUES 
Former FCC Commissioner, Harold Furchtgott-Roth, points out in his book, A 
Tough Act to Follow?, that the structure of the FCC does not allow it to effectively 
regulate the communications industry.  The powers granted to the Commission by the 
Telecommunications Act of 1934 allow it to create the rules, enforce the rules, and 
interpret infractions of the rules, effectively granting the FCC all the power of the Federal  
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Government when it comes to regulating spectrum.  The combination of powers granted 
to the FCC removes the incentive for the Commission to perform any of its assigned 
tasks efficiently.56 
Congress is charged with oversight of the FCC.  However, the FCC has 
historically been slow to respond to the demands of Congress and prefers to act like an 
autonomous agency.  The Judicial Branch is hesitant to overrule the FCC in technical 
matters.  Compounding the impact of these issues, the FCC cannot adequately correct its 
own mistakes made in the regulation process. 
Furchtgott-Roth points out major problems with the FCC in its current form.  
These problems were identified and the Telecommunications Act of 1996 attempted to 
correct them, but did not adequately address the major problems at the FCC.  Two issues 
that create major obstacles in dealing with the FCC are the unending bureaucracy 
problem and the technology retardation problem.57 
The FCC is not in a hurry to respond to requests for action.  The Judicial Branch 
will not intercede until all routes are completely exhausted, which exacerbates the 
problem.  Congress accepts the fact the FCC is slow, since the Commission has 
historically failed to react to Congress’ requests for action. 
According to Furchtgott-Roth, the FCC has retarded the growth of technology.  
The FCC has a long documented history of hindering advances in technology.  The 
following section outlines specific cases where the existence of FCC regulation impacted 
the growth of the wireless communications industry. 
1. FCC History of Obstructing Innovation 
There are numerous examples throughout the history of the FCC of regulating 
decisions hindering the growth of technology.  This section lists a few egregious 
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examples of how decisions not based on fact, but rather political pressure and ideology, 
impacted the growth of beneficial technology. 
1. Frequency Modulation (FM) 
In the 1930s, Edwin Armstrong hypothesized that the use of FM could 
reduce or eliminate the static associated with amplitude modulation (AM) broadcasts.  
“In 1935, Armstrong gave a public demonstration of his FM at the conference of the 
Institute of Radio Engineers.  The audience was treated to a performance of live music 
transmitted with remarkable clarity, better than had been heard before without static.”58  
Armstrong applied for a license with the FCC.  RCA and the National Broadcasting 
Corporation (NBC) lobbied against issuing Armstrong a license.  RCA and NBC saw FM 
as competition since it provided a better quality broadcast. 
In 1940, 150 licenses had been applied for with the FCC and only twenty 
stations were broadcasting using FM technology.  The fight to implement FM in the 
marketplace had cost Armstrong $700,000 to $800,000, with no return on his investment 
as of 1940.59  “It took a full generation for FM to develop into the pervasive and 
flourishing format it is today.”60 
2. Microwave Technology 
Microwave technology introduced competition into the 
telecommunications sector by providing phone service that was transmitted over the 
airwaves instead of through wires.  Microwave Communications Incorporated (MCI) 
believed the emerging technology would introduce competitive phone service into the 
AT&T monopoly.  “The benefits of the new and improved technology were held back by 
the FCC, by monopoly power, or by a combination of the two.”61  With microwave 
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licensing, the FCC missed an opportunity to introduce competition into the 
telecommunications market by rejecting most of MCI’s applications for licenses.  
“Except in limited cases, such as rural areas where AT&T was not providing service, 
companies other than the common carriers - the Bell System and the independent 
telephone carriers - were not allowed to go into the telecommunications business with 
microwaves.”62 
3. Cable Television 
The first cable television systems were developed in the early 1950s.  For 
thirty years, “the FCC succeeded in retarding the development of cable television by 
putting restrictions on the programming cable operators could offer their customers.”63 
4. Cellular Telephone 
It took thirty years for the FCC to issue the first license for cellular 
telephone service.  The FCC received the first license request for cellular telephone 
technology in the 1950s.  It wasn’t until the 1980s that the FCC approved the first 
license.64 
5. Apple and Unlicensed Personal Communication Service (U-PCS) 
In the early 1990s, Apple argued that there needed to be more unlicensed 
spectrum for wireless local area networks (LAN).  “Without considering the option that 
Apple could acquire spectrum rights and configure them for LAN services, the FCC 
mandated a spectrum, imposed standards (including listen-before-talk), and set power 
limits.”65  The allocated spectrum has remained virtually unused.  “The 30 MHz  
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squandered on U-PCS would provide billions in annual consumer surplus gains (through 
lower prices and more minutes of use on wireless phone networks) if PCS operators 
could acquire them.”66 
Over the years, the cost associated with the delayed deployment of 
technologies is inestimable.67  Many applicants were exhausted by the slow response of 
the FCC and the inability of Congress and the Judicial System to intervene. 
F. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The current form of spectrum regulation requires reform.  The bureaucratic 
system creates unnecessary obstacles to the introduction of new technologies.  It also 
allows for external influence in the decision-making process by the Commission.  Even 
the FCC has stated a strategic goal of implementing innovative property models for 
spectrum allocation.  In the next chapter, some innovative property models are outlined 
as the basis for establishing an innovative allocation model that eliminates barriers for 
competition in the electromagnetic spectrum. 
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IV. ACADEMIC PROPOSALS AND THE BENEFITS OF 
PROPERTY-RIGHTS AND DEREGULATION 
This chapter outlines some of the leading proposals for reform in allocating 
spectrum.  The proposals represent fifty years of ideas to make the use of spectrum and 
allocation process more efficient.  They all agree that a property-rights system would 
provide the best method for allocation, but differ in how exactly to implement a property-
rights scheme.  This chapter also contains the real-world spectrum allocation examples 
from Guatemala and El Salvador.  In the late 1990s, the two countries implemented 
property-rights models for spectrum allocation. In this chapter, an analysis of the 
performance of both markets and measures the effects of liberalization on spectrum 
markets is presented.  The last section outlines the benefits that deregulation has provided 
across several industries.  It also takes a look at the benefits of liberalization in the 
electromagnetic spectrum markets and lays out key ideas that lead to successful 
deregulation.   
A. RONALD COASE 
Nobel Prize winning economist, Ronald Coase first wrote about property-rights in 
spectrum in his 1959 article, “The FCC.”  In the article, he contended that the FCC is not 
capable of managing the electromagnetic spectrum and that the competitive market 
would best allocate the medium.      
In his article, Coase introduced a system of property-rights to regulate the 
electromagnetic spectrum.   His article redefined the debate over broadcast regulation in 
the United States.  He pointed out that the FCC continues to regulate the spectrum 
according to the initial standards set in the Federal Radio Act of 1927.  Regulation has 
ignored advances in technology, a better understanding of the electromagnetic spectrum, 
and has relied on an overly-conservative model of regulation that aimed to avoid all 
interference in wireless communications.  He rejected the false notion that FCC 
regulation serves the public’s best interest.  “The complex regulatory apparatus 
developed under the Federal Radio Act of 1927 and re-codified in the Federal 
 32 
Communications Act of 1934 was built on the flawed assumption that scarce resources-in 
this case the radio spectrum-had to be regulated by government fiat.”68 
Coase contended that the FCC does not possess the ability to effectively or 
efficiently regulate the spectrum.  The bureaucratic process is slow and provides the FCC 
too much influence over the decisions about the wireless communications market.  
“Licenses are not issued automatically but are granted or withheld at the discretion of the 
Commission, which is thus in a position to choose those who shall operate radio and 
television stations.”69  Additionally, FCC regulation of the electromagnetic spectrum is 
not the correct mechanism for optimal performance of the broadcast industry. 
An administrative agency which attempts to perform the function 
normally carried out by the pricing mechanism operates under two 
handicaps.  First of all, it lacks the precise monetary measure of benefit 
and cost provided by the market.  Second, it cannot, by the nature of 
things, be in possession of all relevant information processed by the 
managers of every business which uses or might use radio frequencies, to 
say nothing of preferences of consumers for the various goods and 
services in the production of which radio frequencies could be used.70 
More specifically he pointed out that decisions by the FCC only emerged after 
long delays, even years.  According to Coase, the legacy system of regulation used by the 
FCC has unnecessarily restricted innovative uses of the spectrum because of a regulatory 
process that protects incumbents against the introduction of competition into the 
market.71 
Spectrum management is a complicated process.  On the one hand, rules must be 
in place that protect against interference, but the rules should not restrict the growth of 
the industry.  Coase claimed the current form of regulation by the FCC inhibited the 
growth of the wireless industry. 
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The problem confronting the radio industry is that signals transmitted by 
one person may interfere with those transmitted by another.  It can be 
solved by delimiting the rights which various persons possess.  How far 
this delimitation of rights should come about as a result of transactions on 
the market is a question that can be answered only on the basis of practical 
experience.  But there is good reason to believe that the present system, 
which relies exclusively on regulation and in which private property and 
the pricing system play no part, is not the best solution.72  
1. System of Private Property 
The optimum spectrum management system is not necessarily one in which there 
is no interference.  Coase claimed that the purpose of spectrum regulation had not been 
defined correctly.  Instead of a regulation system in the radio industry that aimed to 
minimize interference, a management scheme should be implemented in order to 
maximize output.73  His proposed scheme would treat spectrum licenses like private 
property and allow the market to govern spectrum allocation. 
In his scheme, “the broadcaster would buy the right to use, for a certain period, an 
assigned frequency to transmit signals at a given power for certain hours from a 
transmitter located in a particular place…  It would certainly make it possible for the 
person or firm who is to use a frequency to be determined in the market.”74  Since the 
FCC regulatory system inhibits the growth of industries that rely upon use of the 
frequency spectrum, a new regulatory system that endorses property-rights for radio 
spectrum is needed.  An efficient system would be to establish a set of legal rules for 
operating and then let the institution of private property and the pricing system resolve 
interference issues.  By treating spectrum rights as property, the legal system would sort 
out disputes as it does with disputes over land use and ownership.  Coase believed that a 
system of regulation infringed on the individual’s ability to determine the best utility of  
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their licensed spectrum and it would be better to allow license holders to utilize better 
technology and mutual agreements to make more efficient use of the electromagnetic 
spectrum. 
2. Method of Implementation 
Coase proposed a free-market system of license distribution with minimal 
restrictions imposed only after the exhaustion of free-market tools.  “If the problems 
faced in the broadcasting industry are not out of the ordinary, it may be asked why was 
not the usual solution (a mixture of transferrable rights plus regulation) adopted for this 
industry?”75 
His method for implementing this system should be governed by two basic 
principles:  the free-market will determine best use and pricing in wireless 
communications and restrictions should not be imposed without exhausting all free-
market tools of resolution. 
In his proposal, he stipulated that the frequency band licenses be disposed of to 
the highest bidder.  A system of auctioning off broadcast licenses would determine the 
accurate price for spectrum property using free-market principles.  The best use of the 
utility and accurate pricing would be determined through competitive pricing. 
He also believed that a restriction on the use of a property inhibits the potential 
growth in the wireless spectrum and that a bureaucratic process should not impose 
unnecessary restrictions.  Special regulation should not be imposed without exhausting 
free-market tools and just cause. 
3. Shortcomings of the FCC Regulation Model 
Coase pointed out issues with the model of regulation that the FCC uses, as well 
as the structure of the regulating agency.  He believed that the FCC should not have 
complete oversight of the entire allocation process; the Judicial System was not able to 
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adequately address the issue before severe regulation was imposed; lawmakers did not 
sufficiently understand the problems presented in wireless communication; and, the FCC 
was susceptible to outside influences in the decision-making process. 
Coase used the comparison of spectrum management to property and business 
laws.  Most every allocation scheme requires administrative oversight but not complete 
regulation.  Property owners are subject to zoning laws and business owners face 
regulations; but in spectrum allocation the FCC has total authority in all matters.  The 
decision to extensively regulate the wireless spectrum was made with the Radio Act of 
1927, prior to the courts ever having the ability to impose limitations to successfully 
settle interference disputes.  “No doubt, in time, statutes prescribing some special 
regulation would also have been required.  But this line of development was stopped by 
the passage of the 1927 Act, which established a complete regulatory system.”76 
In reviewing the testimony and written history of the debates leading to the 
Federal Radio Act of 1927, Coase concluded that the policy makers did not fully 
comprehend the situation they were governing.77  He pointed out two things:  that 
regulation was a reaction to the politicians not understanding the problem; and, that if 
they did not take action, they could never regain control, “What does not seem to have 
been understood is that what is being allocated by the Federal Communications 
Commission, or, if there were a market, what would be sold, is the right to use a piece of 
equipment to transmit signals in a particular way.”78 
His final problem with the FCC’s role in regulating the wireless spectrum was 
that the FCC is susceptible to outside influence.  “The Federal Communications 
Commission has recently come into public prominence as a result of disclosures before 
the House Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight, concerning the extent to which 
pressure is brought to bear on the Commission by politicians and businessman (who often  
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use methods of dubious propriety) with a view to influence its decisions.”79  He implied 
that if the broadcast rights were allocated to the highest bidder in a property-rights 
scheme the improprieties would disappear. 
B. ARTHUR DE VANY 
In 1968, the government released a document titled, “The President’s Task Force 
on Communications Policy.”  A group of people who worked as consultants to the staff 
wrote a paper to promote the idea of utilizing property-rights in spectrum in order 
promote public support and possibly get Congressional approval for experimental 
deployment of the idea.  The paper was a collaboration of five authors, however Arthur 
De Vany gets singular credit for advancing the ideas presented in this section.  This paper 
refers to the ideas as De Vany’s, but credit should also go to the other authors as well:  
Ross Eckert, Charles Meyers, Donald O’Hara, and Richard Scott. 
In a 1969 article, Arthur De Vany introduced a practical implementation scheme 
for spectrum management.  He and his colleagues presented a proposal that defined the 
physical and economic characteristics of spectrum, applied a general economic theory of 
property to spectrum allocation, defined a system of spectrum-use rights, analyzed legal 
and transactional problems associated with the proposed scheme, and introduced legal 
methods for the government to dispose of the spectrum rights. 
The operation of a market in spectrum use depends, as we have noted, on 
the creation of a property system in the spectrum; that is, it depends upon 
the specification of a system of rights and duties of users sufficiently 
certain in meaning, sufficiently enforceable, and sufficiently valuable that 
people are willing to spend money to acquire the right.80 
The authors noted that it was the confused condition of the radio industry that led 
directly to the regulation of the industry.  De Vany saw two problems with the FCC’s 
regulation of the wireless spectrum.  First, the rights allocated in licenses contain few 
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incentives to make efficient use of the allocated spectrum.  Second, the regulatory 
practices that were adopted in 1927 have not kept up with advances in technology.  
Proponents of deregulating the wireless spectrum argue that the market process will 
encourage more efficiency and better satisfy consumer needs.  Opponents believe that 
electromagnetic waves are too difficult to contain in order to effectively manage an 
allocation policy that is usable.  They still fear the pre-1927 chaos that existed in the 
radio industry. 
Implementation of De Vany’s proposal of property-rights requires three elements.  
First, the rights are valuable and unambiguous, as well as compatible with the special 
properties of the electromagnetic energy.  Second, there is a legal mechanism for 
enforcement of these rights.  Third, the definition of rights provides for the initial 
distribution of government-owned spectrum to the public for use.81 
One of the most important ideas that De Vany introduced was his definition of 
exclusive property, with respect to spectrum allocation.  He identified three 
characteristics, time, coverage area, and bandwidth, that make each piece of the 
electromagnetic spectrum unique for use in a property-rights scheme.  He referred to this 
model as the Time-Area-Spectrum (TAS) model.  Each TAS entity, or property, refers to 
the time period of allowable transmission, the geographic area where the waves are 
spread, and the frequency band used in transmission.82 
He believed that the economic and technological benefits associated with 
property-rights more than outweighed the risks associated with property-rights to allocate 
spectrum.  Additionally, improvements in technology have further mitigated the risks 
associated with deregulation of the electromagnetic spectrum. 
Several precautions can be taken to reduce interference from such 
extraneous radiation.  First, the rate of transmission and the method of 
modulation must be consistent with the time and bandwidth available 
within the TAS package.  Second, careful design of transmitters can avoid 
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the generation of spurious frequencies; proper filtering and shielding can 
reduce sensitivity to such spurious signals.  Third, adequate maintenance 
service for both transmitters and receivers can assure their proper 
functioning.83 
Experimentation with property-rights is warranted considering the inefficiency of 
the current system.  The current shared use of the unlicensed spectrum bands further 
supports De Vany’s assertion.  Chaotic broadcasting conditions have not been the result; 
but instead, companies have cooperated in order to make better use of the asset allocated 
for use in the unlicensed spectrum.  
1. Economic Theories for Spectrum Use 
There are four economic characteristics that provide inherent value for the 
allocated resource:  exclusivity, costs of exchange and enforcement, externalities, and 
flexibility.  From these characteristics a property-rights system must be devised to take 
into account all the benefits that are provided by each characteristic as well as devise 
limitations in order to create the most beneficial allocation system.  “A particular 
resource use can be more costly (or less rewarding) under one set of rights and duties 
than under another; and the more costly any given behavior is, the less of it we should 
expect to observe.”84  
a. Exclusivity 
The idea of exclusivity is that the allocated resource will be most valuable 
when the right to use it is exclusive to one user.  It is also more valuable when there are 
no exclusions placed on the manner that the owner can use it.  The exclusive license 
allows the owner to exclude others from using their resource.85  It was because of non-
exclusivity of spectrum-use that led to the initial government regulation by the Federal 
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Radio Commission, later the FCC, in 1927.  The regulation solution was to grant 
exclusive rights with no flexibility in use, and little flexibility in operation.  De Vany’s 
solution proposed exclusive rights without the economically inefficient restrictions. 
b. Costs of Exchange and Enforcement 
The aim of the spectrum allocation policy should be to ensure that 
minimal costs are involved to exchange rights or monitor the spectrum in order to 
promote efficient use of the spectrum policy.86  If the rights are able to be freely 
exchanged and divided at low cost, the owner of the rights will more likely devote his or 
her assets to their most valuable use.  By applying economic cost analysis, a transaction 
will occur only when the cost of the transaction is less than the economic benefit foreseen 
by making the transaction.  Lower costs in the transfer of rights will maximize the 
potential use of all the resources allocated in the spectrum. 
c. Externalities 
Externalities are actions by others in the area whose actions impact your 
business or property.  There are beneficial and detrimental externalities.  For example, if 
a factory pollutes the water upstream of a farmer, the polluted water supply is a 
detrimental externality to the farmer.  If a beekeeper increases production, the positive 
effect on the neighboring apple orchard is a beneficial externality.87 
Externalities are an important aspect in the electromagnetic spectrum since 
radio waves cannot be completely confined and predicted.  De Vany asserts the 
establishment of property-rights in the electromagnetic spectrum must allow for 
contracting between rights-holders in order to resolve interference disputes efficiently.88 
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De Vany outlined three categories of property-rights and their degrees of 
flexibility.  The first category of property-rights is prohibited activities.  The second is 
permitted activities as part of a right.  The final category is activities permitted if the 
consent of other parties is obtained.89 
He stated that activities should not be placed in the category of prohibited 
actions unless there are enough affected parties that the exchange of rights costs are so 
high they would prevent the exchange.  The second category is the most flexible for the 
individual; however, if the collective group is afforded the same flexibility, the rights of 
the individual may be infringed upon.90  The goal of a property-rights system is to 
provide a balanced scheme that allows for individual flexibility yet provides protection 
for each issued license to operate according to its definition.  “The primary problem in 
designing a market system is not to decide whether an activity should be placed in 
Category 1 or Category 2, but to define property-rights so that it will be economically 
attractive to place an activity in either Category 2 or Category 3.”91 
e. Criterion for the Definition of Property-rights 
In devising a system of property-rights for use in spectrum allocation, 
there are tradeoffs that must be considered.  It would be possible to implement a plan that 
contains less costly enforcement means, but it is done at the cost of less flexibility and 
reduced transferability.  The goal of the property-rights definition is to maximize the 
social value of production from use of the electromagnetic spectrum. 
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2. Proposed Property System 
In De Vany’s proposal for property-rights, he analyzed a realistic implementation 
for allocating spectrum and provided alternative definitions of property-rights with 
respect to spectrum allocation.  He justified his selection of the most beneficial model 
against other definitions he considered. 
a. Property Definition 
The definition of the property is broken down into three characteristics, as 
noted earlier:  the time allowed to transmit, the geographic area where propagation of 
electromagnetic waves is permitted, and the permissible frequency band of transmission. 
(1)  Time Rights.  The time characteristic specified that time rights 
should be allocated to license holders for the entire twenty-four hour period of each day.  
The license holder and customer would be able to make sub-arrangements without 
restriction by the government-issuing agency.92 
(2)  Area Rights.  The characteristic of area defined two important 
features of the property specification.  The license holder would possess the exclusive 
rights to radiate in an area, subject to the constraint that the field strength is not above 
some allowable value at any point outside the designated area.  Secondly, the rights 
holder would be free from fields exceeding the same allowable value at any point within 
their geographic boundary emitted from external areas.93  Realistic electromagnetic 
boundaries do not follow straights lines and legal boundaries, but De Vany’s proposal 
would have enforced straight-line boundaries.  Lower enforcement costs would be 
involved with simple geographic boundaries in order to eliminate un-zoned areas where 
squatters could increase enforcement and exchange costs.  Squatters find unlicensed areas 
and obtain the rights in that area for the sole purpose of detecting emissions from 
adjacent areas.  This allows them to bring litigation because their property-rights were 
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infringed upon.  Allocating straight-line boundaries minimizes the amount of pockets 
where licenses can be established for the purposes of eliciting payment from an adjacent 
license holder or filing lawsuits.  These frivolous lawsuits would unnecessarily drive up 
all costs associated with the spectrum allocation scheme. 
(3)  Spectrum Rights.  Adjacent spectrum channels emit energies 
that may infringe upon adjoining frequencies.  The level of spillover needs to be limited 
in order to provide protection against interference.  Some spillover should be allowed in 
order to ensure that the property model maximizes the use of the electromagnetic 
spectrum, yet at the same time provide a maximum level of spillover in order to protect 
the adjacent user’s right to broadcast freely.  De Vany defined the spectrum rights as the 
frequency band where the licensee is permitted to transmit.  It established a set threshold 
where transmitting above that level would not allowed in adjacent bands.  De Vany’s 
definition of spectrum rights is illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3.   Example Spectrum Band94 
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“Within a given area the right specified gives A the right to originate radiation in area A 
over the band of, say, 90.0 to 90.5 MHz, with a field strength not greater than Y v/m in 
another band, such as 90.5 to 91.0 MHz, owned by C.”95 
The optimal TAS information has not been prepared yet, but 
through market exchanges the licensees can make arrangements in order to maximize the 
spectrum use through TAS rights.  Initial best engineering judgments should be made for 
an optimal TAS package, however, subsequent changes can be optimized in the 
marketplace to account for the dynamic environment; changes in population 
concentration, demand, costs, and technologies.  TAS definition of property-rights deals 
with the exclusivity and externality problem in allocating spectrum.96 
b. Spectrum Use Implications 
Opponents of property-rights in spectrum allocation claim that the realistic 
physical properties of electromagnetic waves make it impossible to use property-rights in 
spectrum allocation.  De Vany looks at multiple problems associated with 
electromagnetic wave properties, such as variation in wave propagation, multipath 
propagation, inter-modulation interference, and the size of the service area. 
(1)  Multipath Propagation. It is possible that a wave will take two 
paths to reach the same point.  This results in a field strength greater that the maximum 
allowable and results in violating the license agreement.  This same rule that will require 
you to limit your field strength because of the multiple paths that a wave takes also 
protects your broadcast rights against neighbors experiencing the same multipath 
propagation problem. 
(2)  Inter-modulation Interference. Inter-modulation occurs when 
two frequencies combine to interfere with a third frequency in the same time and area 
location.  This type of interference is mostly caused by the proximity of the transmitters.  
De Vany proposes a solution where the third party whose entrance causes the problem 
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should be held accountable to fix the problem.  In order to limit litigation costs, the 
easiest solution is to put responsibility on the last person to the table in order to ensure 
continued operation of all parties involved.    In his solution, the third party could 
continue to transmit and pay damages to the affected parties, shift operating frequency, 
pay the others to shift their operating frequency, or pay for better isolation of the affected 
transmitters.  When there is no physical link determined to cause the interference, the 
third party would be held responsible to determine the solution, as well. 
(3)  Service Area Size, Boundary Effects, and Optimal Frequency. 
Signal-to-interference ratios are highest at the boundaries.  If two adjoining geographic 
areas are transmitting identical frequencies, it can create a zone along the boundary where 
interference precludes both transmissions.  Lower frequency transmission will reach a 
larger area, but have a larger probability of interfering with adjacent signals of identical 
frequency near the boundary.  One technique to resolve such an issue is to use lower 
frequencies for larger, less dense, areas and higher frequencies in more densely populated 
areas to minimize interference zones at the boundaries.    Table 3 illustrates the size of a 
serviceable area for a given frequency, range, and signal quality.  For a given broadcast 
radius, frequency, and acceptable noise level, the table shows the percentage of the 
coverage area where the signal is received. 
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There are additional factors to consider when determinging the optimal frequency for use.   
Lower frequencies allow for a longer transmission radius while broadcasting at a lower 
power.  Economic and physical constraints will keep towers to appropriate size for 
desired conditions. 
3. Alternative Definitions Considered 
In choosing the TAS model for his property-rights proposal, De Vany investigated 
three alternative approaches; a zero-limit definition, residue definition, and the boundary-
positive-limit definition.  The zero-limit definition allows no spillover of frequency into 
adjacent areas and limits the licensee’s flexibility unnecessarily.  The residue-definition 
makes the owner of a property right responsible for all boundary emissions from their 
geographic location, whether emitted by them or not.  This type of enforcement results in 
extremely high enforcement and exchange costs.  In the boundary-positive-limit 
definition, the signal strengths are only measured at the boundaries and result in stricter 
enforcement and less flexibility.  This does not provide an adequate level of protection 
from infringing interference.98  De Vany rejected these possibilities because they all had 
higher costs associated with each of them and did not provide the necessary protection 
and flexibility of enforcing a maximum field strength limit outside the licensed 
geographic area. 
4. Special Legal Aspects 
A property-rights system must assert general legal rules to ensure that the market 
allocates resources efficiently.  The general statement of purpose should state that the 
goal of the property-rights system is “to create property interests in a designated portion 
of the spectrum in order to promote market allocation of this resource.”99  Courts and all 
administrative agencies should be directed to interperet this statute to achieve the stated 
objetive.  This includes defining an agency to define property interests in spectrum (TAS 
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packages), create and oversee purchase methods, declaration of user rights, a central 
collection of public rights exchanges, and a limit on the duration of a TAS package.  The 
declaration of the TAS user’s rights should include the following stipulations: the owners 
may agree to boundary changes without third party authorization, simply notification; 
when rights are transferrable; authorization for owners to mutually agree to signal 
increases and decreases; transferability of all or part of the property-rights between 
parties; and no restrictions on the use of technology or antenna limitations.100  A central 
collection database should be maintained that tracks TAS package changes that is 
accessible to the public.  Finally, he proposes a time limit fot the TAS rights to expire or, 
more specifically, a rental agreement.  He ultimately believes that perpetual rights is the 
ideal process but recognizes the government must maintain some minimal level of control 
over the spectrum to recapture wealth and spectrum due to failure.  Therefore, he believes 
that a system of rent over a long period is a more realistic approach.101  This allows for 
the government to re-allocate resources that are being wasted through default. 
C. PHILIP WEISER AND DALE HATFIELD 
Philip Weiser is a law professor with a background in telecommunications 
policies.  Dale Hatfield has over forty years of experience in the telecommunications 
sector and served at the FCC from 1997 through 2000.  He served as Chief of the Office 
of Engineering and Technology prior to his retirement from government service.  
Recently, the two published an article outlining their proposed scheme for improving 
spectrum allocation. 
The same spectrum regulation scheme has been in effect since the regulations 
were initially established in 1927.  One of the first proposals for a free-market approach 
to spectrum allocation ocurred over fifty years ago when Coase first criticized the current 
spectrum regulation and called for tradeable property-rights.  Even the FCC’s own 
Spectrum Policy Task Force has called for replacing the restrictive scheme.  Although the 
                                                 
100 Arthur S. De Vany, Ross Eckert, Charles Meyers, and Richard Scott.  “A Property System for 
Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic Spectrum:  A Legal-Economic-Engineering Study.”  Stanford 
Law Review 21.6 (1969):  1530. 
101 Ibid., 1531. 
 47 
call for reform is overwhelming and desperately needed, the FCC halted progress towards 
a implementing a liberalized spectrum allocation scheme in 2007.  The agency effectively 
ignored the “increasing dissatisfaction with the current approach to spectrum 
management which suppresses competitive entry, blocks efficient transfer of spectrum to 
higher value use, and insulates old technologies from innovative chalenge.”102 
Most would agree that implementing property-rights for spectrum allocation 
would be the most beneficial, Weiser and Hatfield contend that a more complex model, 
than the classic model of tresspass law, needs to be developed in the context of real 
property.  “Policy makers must develop a set of rights and remedies around spectrum 
property-rights that reflect the fact that radio signals defy boundaries and can propagate 
in unpredictable ways.”103  They contend that the new scheme must not only create a 
viable implementation of a property system, but must protect licensees from interference.  
Their proposal includes complex predictive modeling, using computer simulation, to 
ensure that interference will not occur under any proposed licensing scheme.  
Additionally, they provide an outline of the type of regulating body required for the 
enforcement of their regulation scheme. 
1. Current Issues 
In general, people do not know how wireless technology works or how it is 
regulated.  The FCC, as it regulates today, is inefficient and protects incumbents from 
competition in the markets.  There are unacceptable delays in the current system that 
cause long and costly delays in launching new technologies.  The financial effect on the 
wireless communications industry is ghastly.  “The loss from delays in the rollout of 
more and better services occasioned by the legacy model of spectrum regulation was 
estimated in 1994 to be as high as $33.5 billion.”104  The FCC maintains control over all 
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aspects of spectrum regulation.  The traditional command-and-control model allows for 
all decisions affecting the industry to be made by one governing body:  the FCC. 
a. Weaknesses of the Current Regulation Model 
The current FCC regulation of the wireless spectrum is technically, 
economically, and politically inefficient.  The current model is based on the “wise man” 
theory of regulation.105  It is the government that allocates the spectrum for wireless 
services like cellular telephone, broadcasting, and personal mobile devices.  The 
government that determines how the spectrum will be divided for each user and use, and 
what types of equipment and technologies will be allowed for use in each block of 
spectrum.  The government also grants the licenses that assigns the available shannels to 
an applicant for use.  Finally, the government is also responsible for monitoring the usage 
of the airwaves. 
“Regulatory decisions and not market forces are capable of deciding what 
is best for the public.”106  It is this mindset that resulted directly from the chaotic mess in 
broadcasting during the 1920s.  The feeling was that without government supervision of 
the spectrum, users would interfere with one another and no one would be able to 
communicate.  Today, the FCC continues to regulate the wireless spectrum with the same 
overly-conservative regulatory mindset that was originally devised in the late 1920s. 
The initial regulation scheme attempted to guarantee that there was 
absolutely no interference with licensed channels.  The FCC’s model of regulation 
guarantees successful transmission through inefficient use of the spectrum.107  In the 
curent model, two operators using the same channel are required to have a minimal 
physical distance between their transmitters.  Additionally, there are mandated “guard 
bands” between adjacent frequencies that ensure no spillover.  The buffered zones 
between channels and transmitters were determined based upon models using the worst 
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performance view of both transmitters and receivers.  The regulation goal of the FCC was 
“that none of the signal - even at a fairly low power - of the undesired transmission would 
bleed into the adjacent channel.”108  Figure 4 represents a visual description of a primary 
channel with the adjacent guard bands as regulated by the FCC. 
 
Figure 4.   Ideal vs. Actual Spectrum Band109 
The overly conservative view of regulation has allowed the government to 
successfully establish an effective wireless communications industry within the United 
States.  However, the FCC continues to make regulation decisions in the same 
conservative manner originated in the 1920s.  The FCC fails to modernize their 
regulation scheme as improvements are made within the industry.  Better technology, 
knowledge, and modeling tools are available today that would improve the rules for 
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spectrum regulation and make more efficient use of the spectrum.  Weiser and Hatfield 
agree with Coase’s assessment that an improved regulation scheme consisting of well-
defined property-rights and low transaction costs will allow parties the bargaining tools to 
reach efficient outcomes.  Spectrum regulation should ensure that gain from allowing 
additional interference more than offsets the harm it produces.110 
b. Need for Reform 
Numerous examples of FCC inflexibility exist but Weiser and Hatfield 
point to an egregious process and decision by the FCC as a prime example for why the 
current model needs change.  Qualcomm attempted to create a new video service to 
mobile subscribers.  The service might have interfered with adjacent services.  
Qualcomm offered the FCC a solution based on previous FCC guidance and requested 
permission to proceed.  After twenty months, the FCC responded with a streamlined 
proposal for interference management deemed acceptable.  Ultimately, the FCC never 
approved either solution, reverting back to their original policy that precludes all chances 
of interference.111  “At present, the regulatory strategy for guarding against interference 
is notoriously undefined, moves too slowly to offer effective guidance, raises 
transactional costs (as well as entry barriers), and leads to underuse of the spectrum.”112 
2. Spectrum Regulation Model 
Weiser and Hatfield challenge “the conventional wisdom that establishing 
spectrum property-rights is a fairly straightforward issue and can be managed along the 
lines outlined in the De Vany study.”113  The successes of the cellular bands are a good 
reason to shift towards a property-rights scheme, but they hesitantly point out that the 
characteristics for the successes may not be universally applied.  Nonetheless, 
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Despite the difficulties associated with establishing property rights in the 
space and frequency dimensions, the cases of television broadcasting and 
cellular telephone provide powerful precedents that when the FCC has 
established property rights in certain services, interference issues at the 
associated boundaries can be successfully resolved.  Notably, valuable 
transactions involving the transfer of those rights take place on a routine 
basis, and affected parties work together to minimize interference.  In 
cellular services, for example, the geographic spillover limit is the 
maximum signal strength permitted at the boundary and disputes over 
interference there are routinely solved without the involvement of the 
FCC.114 
The technical properties of cellular bands are less prone to boundary variations in wave 
strength, therefore minimizing interference.  The transmissions are cellularized and there 
are a small number of providers consistent across the majority of the regions, which 
promotes cooperative behavior amongst participants. 
Weiser and Hatfield contend that an increased level of supervision would be 
required to implement a broader property-rights scheme for spectrum allocation.  It is 
their contention that boundary disputes involving interference will not be adequately 
supervised and will lead to a loss of confidence in the markets.  Interference must be 
avoided for any property-rights system to work. 
We are skeptical that this confidence will be borne out in numerous other 
contexts and think the uncertainty (or ‘messiness’) of geographic 
boundary rights caused by signal strength variations will make agreeing on 
reasonable agreements to avoid interference difficult.  Instead, we believe 
that regular or occasional islands of interference across geographic 
boundaries that are tolerated today will become subject of litigation.115 
Their proposed system requires the use of extensive computer modeling to ensure that 
interference disputes will be kept to an absolute minimum and that license holders are 
protected from frivolous lawsuits that may emerge because of the varying nature of wave 
propagation.  “The FCC’s inability to enforce property-rights could (1) effectively  
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undermine investment incentives and the development of new services, and (2) 
encourages self-help behavior whereby parties seek to make life difficult for one another 
to achieve business advantage.”116 
3. Predictive Modeling 
Electromagnetic transmissions will act differently depending on the temperature, 
season, time of day, and weather conditions as noted previously.  During the night, a 
transmission signal of the same strength will propagate further than it will during the day 
as is readily recognized by late-night listeners of the AM radio band.  Weiser and 
Hatfield believe that because of this unpredictable behavior, one traditional model of 
trespass law cannot be applied across the entire spectrum.  An oversight agency should 
model the maximum signal strengths at boundaries and not aim to avoid interference 
completely, but “maximize total utility in each band rather than to minimize interference 
to any spectrum user.”117  They endorse utilizing complex software modeling programs 
and using probability models of transmission behavior to create geographic boundaries to 
enhance a property-rights scheme of spectrum regulation.   Although it cannot predict 
with 100% accuracy, a model can be generated to predict the behavior and broadcast 
market for transmitted signals in a geographic location.  These predictive models should 
be verified and checked with real data in order to improve modeling fidelity and increase 
the accuracy of the models.  The initial models may be on the conservative side but the 
monitoring will improve the modeling process to support the efficient use of the 
spectrum. 
The scheme does not restrict the types of equipment but limits the level of the 
signal strength at the boundary, as proposed by De Vany.  The only control the FCC 
would have over the license holder would be to set, monitor, and adjust the maximum 
signal strength allowed at the boundary. 
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The authors do not investigate the type of business models required in the 
implementation of their scheme.  Before a property-rights regulation scheme could be 
implemented, further analysis would be needed to determine the best models to deploy in 
the different frequency ranges. 
Weiser and Hatfield caution against the possibility of people purchasing rights 
only to catch people interfering with them in order to file lawsuits in court.  This behavior 
is similar to what occurs in patent trolling.  The authors believe that their predictive 
modeling technique will minimize, if not eliminate, this behavior in their proposed 
scheme. 
D. THOMAS HAZLETT 
Professor Thomas Hazlett currently serves as the Director of the Information 
Economy Project at George Mason Law School.  He is a former Chief Economist at the 
FCC.  Hazlett asserts that regulation leads to anti-consumer outcomes.  He believes that 
exclusive property-rights will shift towards a competitive market. 
The 2002 Spectrum Policy Task Force outlined three approaches towards 
spectrum regulation:  exclusive-use, commons approach, and command-and-control.118  
The FCC normally follows the traditional command-and-control model and has shifted 
more towards the commons approach, through unlicensed bands, to spectrum allocation.  
Hazlett believes that the FCC has not adequately analyzed the potential value of spectrum 
in its decision to move towards the commons approach for spectrum allocation.  He 
believes that the best method of spectrum allocation removes the bureaucratic process of 
allocation and leaves it to the free and competitive market to sort out spectrum allocation.  
In this way, decisions about the best use of the spectrum would be made by consumers 
based upon their needs rather than by a regulator.   
The FCC touts exclusive-use and commons as liberal alternatives to 
traditional regulation, for example, but it ignores the fact that the 
bureaucratic selection process it recommends constitutes command and 
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control.  Thus, some of the wireless market organization[s] are chosen - 
and others excluded - not by competitive market but by administrative 
allocation.119 
1. Misguided Regulation 
The current FCC policies aimed towards improving the spectrum allocation 
process fail to take full advantage of the spectrum market..  The decision makers define 
exclusive-use while excluding certain activities from exclusive-use, which is a 
contradiction of the definition.  Exclusive-use will be the most efficient use of spectrum 
in most cases.  Property-rights eliminate the barriers to productive use of the spectrum.  
Without those barriers, society will not have to wait for the government to make 
decisions.  Eliminating the regulation barriers leads directly to competition and 
innovation.120 
The FCC’s shift towards the commons approach for spectrum regulation is not 
based on an accurate study of the facts.  Analysis of the policy reveals flaws: the 
government assumes that shared use is the best method without adequate analysis.  There 
is no mechanism currently to determine the actual value of spectrum rights.  Shifting 
towards a system of property-rights will allow for development of such a mechanism to 
determine the actual value of a given asset. 
It is easy to figure out how much additional acreage to expand Central 
Park would cost the city, or how much revenue it would generate by 
selling a portion of it.  Without private property-rights, these values are 
concealed, and the government agency supplying the public park’s 
amenities lacks the [criteria] necessary for efficient decision making.121 
Initial market costs and decisions made by asset owners reveal the true costs and 
benefits, as well as an efficient organizational structure for wireless markets.  Any 
regulation will impose limits on the capital market discovery process.  Hazlett is not 
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arguing completely against the commons approach.  He is only pointing out that without 
property-rights, the government cannot accurately value the assets it is charged with 
managing.  “[Establishing] property-rights doesn’t preclude a commons approach - it 
rationalizes it.”122 
2. Property Definition 
Four basic property regimes have emerged over the years.  “Open access” allows 
exploitation without limit, “state property” limits the use through rules created by 
governments, “commons property” limits the use through rules created by a group of 
owners, and “private property” allows for rules crafted by a single user.123 
The current form of regulation in the United States, and almost everywhere else, 
can be described best as “state property.”  The public-interest regulations result in 
decisions that squander possibilities for more effective airwave utilization.  “A given set 
of state-property rules blocks alternative property regimes from governing the airwaves, 
and these would yield valuable opportunities as well.”124  Hazlet states that the current 
form of regulation that aims to eliminate interference needs to be replaced by a more 
efficient system.  “Potential conflicts are a byproduct of productive airwave use; efficient 
rules maximize the total value of wireless applications rather than minimize 
disruptions.”125 
Critics of property-rights point to the level of investment in WiFi technology as 
an example of the success of unlicensed spectrum.  Investment in cellular technologies is 
double the amount invested in WiFi and consumers spend $8 billion annually, way more 
than WiFi.  Using that argument, television would be seen as a triumph for regulation by 
the FCC.  However, look at what the television spectrum is actually worth. 
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Government planners set aside bandwidth with very high value for an 
over-the-air delivery platform that nearly 90 percent of U.S. households 
pay to bypass via cable or satellite.  Given the incremental cost of moving 
to 100 percent cable and satellite distribution for broadcast TV content is 
on the order of just $3 billion, whereas the social value of the 402 MHz 
now walled off for broadcast TV service is likely to exceed $2 trillion.126 
Using this argument, Hazlett deduces that the FCC’s analysis shows the commons 
approach to spectrum regulation as being optimal is flawed. 
The state-property regime dissipates spectrum value.  If we used a more efficient 
model for spectrum use, we could have all the benefits of television and take advantage 
of the high value of wasted spectrum in the television broadcast spectrum. 
The FCC feels that it should allocate more spectrum for unlicensed use.  The 
government feels that it has been a success and, therefore, it is the best use of the 
spectrum.  This line of thought also shows that more allocation of spectrum for television 
broadcast, since there are 2.7 televisions per household in America, would be wise.  
However, Hazlett’s statement above shows that the FCC is blocking off $2 trillion worth 
of spectrum band for inefficient allocation to broadcast television.  The FCC’s approach 
to incremental unlicensed allocations lacks the needed multilayered analysis.127  Just 
because you have determined one set of frequencies to be valuable, it does not imply the 
same gains from additional bandwidth. 
3. Call for Property-rights 
Hazlett calls on policy makers to identify and move towards property-rights 
alternatives for spectrum allocation.  The competitive market forces should search, test, 
and reveal a variety of alternatives and gauge their value.  Hazlett highlights that the call 
for property-rights is even proposed by two people at the FCC, Evan Kwerel and John 
Williams. 
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Kwerel and Williams note, ‘Future expansion of dedicated spectrum for 
unlicensed use could be obtained through negotiation between the 
manufacturers of such devices and spectrum licensees…  Competition 
between licensees would ensure that fees reflect the opportunity cost of 
the spectrum.  Alternatively, manufacturers of low power devices might 
form a bidding consortium to acquire additional spectrum in our auction.  
If there is a continued desire as a matter of public policy to provide for 
such services on a free basis, the FCC itself might purchase the spectrum 
in auction, essentially reducing overall proceeds to the Treasury.  This 
would have the advantage of making the opportunity cost of such 
allocations more explicit.’128 
The consensus among economists is that a liberal ownership regime eliminates 
the barriers to competition that the current regime imposes.  Hazlett proposes to allow 
owners, suppliers, consumers, and providers to make rational economic decisions that 
satisfy the consumer demands.  While the current organization of the wireless markets 
may not be the most effective, “…trial and error of the market is a reliable mechanism to 
test alternatives.”129  This suggests the government, with a regulatory mindset, may not 
be the most able to provide a “commons” approach for consumer use. 
a. Creation of Nextel 
Hazlett uses the description of the creation of Nextel as an example of 
what can be created through market forces when restrictions are lifted.  Forty years ago, 
the FCC allocated a 19 MHz band of specialized mobile radio (SMR) licenses from the 
800 MHz cellular bands in every market.  In the 1980s a former FCC lawyer began 
purchasing SMR licenses and acquired 40,000 licenses to form one nationwide network.  
He requested that the FCC remove limitations on the intended use of the bandwidth and 
the FCC approved.  According to market costs, he determined that the bands could be 
used for both SMR services and cellular telephone.  He transformed non-revenue-
                                                 
128 Thomas W. Hazlett.  “The Spectrum Analysis Debate:  An Analysis.”  IEEE Internet Computing 
10.5 (2006):  72. 
129 Ibid. 
 58 
generating spectrum into 16 million subscriptions and sold it in 2005 for $35 billion.130 
“Markets are quite effective in discovering how to achieve efficient transactions.”131 
Liberalizing the spectrum will clear the way for future companies to 
produce innovative concepts using that spectrum.  Liberalization of the spectrum 
empowers experimentation with alternative technologies and allows for the government 
to determine which forms of spectrum access need to be subsidized, just like a public 
park. 
b. Proposed Experiment 
Hazlett proposes that the FCC release a small piece of the overall 
spectrum to different users to determine the feasibility of property-rights and to collect 
free market data about the value of the electromagnetic spectrum. 
If the 402 MHz TV band could be divvied into five nationwide overlay 
licenses of approximately 80 MHz each and then sold at auction, five rival 
spectrum-sharing plans would emerge.  Rationalization of the TV band, 
including rechanneling of TV stations, would expand wireless 
opportunities and unleash new technologies, services, and networks.  
Consumers, vendors, application suppliers, content owners, and investors 
would reward those creating the greatest value.  Nothing requires a decade 
of rule making.  To sacrifice the social gains of this exclusive ownership 
path is to incur another tragedy of the anti-market.132 
E. REAL WORLD IMPLEMENTATION OF LIBERALIZED SPECTRUM 
ALLOCATION POLICIES IN EL SALVADOR AND GUATEMALA 
Economists embrace the idea for wireless licenses but the underlying resource, 
radio spectrum, continues to be allocated administratively in most of the world.  
Sweeping telecommunications reforms occurred in El Salvador and Guatemala.  
Guatemala instituted their drastic spectrum policy reforms in 1996 and El Salvador 
adopted their new policy in 1997. 
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The policies implemented in Guatemala and El Salvador are important because 
the spectrum liberalization proposals of the last forty years can finally be discussed in 
light of the results obtained from the wireless spectrum markets of Guatemala and El 
Salvador.  Spectrum is a fertile field for economic analysis and it is economically 
important.  The liberalization of El Salvador’s and Guatemala’s spectrum allocation 
policies allow us to analyze empirical results and discuss the benefits and pitfalls 
associated with the actual transition by governments towards liberal spectrum allocation 
policies. 
1. El Salvador 
The country of El Salvador passed two significant legal reforms to its 
telecommunications in 1996.  First, they established a regulatory body, the General 
Superintendent of Electricity and Telecommunications (SIGET).  Second, the laws 
reformed telecommunications, privatized the state-run telecommunications monopoly, 
Antel, and introduced competition into the mobile telephony market.133  In El Salvador, 
license limitations were eliminated and interference concessions formed the constraints 
imposed by operators.  Concessions represent the license to operate under El Salvador’s 
new spectrum allocation scheme. 
Requests for new concessions are reviewed for approval by a regulator.  
Concessions are not privately owned; however, “liberalization is achieved by a statutory 
provision permitting license holders full flexibility in the use of allocated frequencies.”134  
The concession allows for leasing a band of spectrum, where the government retains 
ownership, but grants the concession-holder full flexibility to modify and sub-divide their 
asset.  
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a. The Elements of El Salvadorian Reform 
The SIGET monitors the spectrum and other activities to detect and limit 
illegal use of the spectrum.  SIGET operators are usually passive.  The SIGET processes 
complaints and petitions that are brought to them by concession holders. 
(1)  Categories of Use.  The reforms in El Salvador identified three 
general use categories:  official use, free use, and regulated or commercial use.135  
Official use is reserved for government agencies or set aside by international treaties.  
Users must receive authorization to use this spectrum.  Free use is a small amount of 
spectrum set aside for the general public to use.  Regulated or commercial use provides 
for the most liberal set of rules.  Government issued concessions are required to operate 
in these bands. 
(2)  Application Process.  There is a six-step process in El Salvador 
for new users to procure a concession:  1) A new user petitions the SIGET for the right to 
a concession.  2) The SIGET considers the application.  The application can be 
immediately rejected by the SIGET if the requested spectrum is already in use, there is no 
requirement to possess a concession for broadcasting in the requested spectrum, the 
applicant has previous violations of telecommunications law, or the applicant is not 
eligible to own a concession.  3) Once the request is deemed as valid, the SIGET 
publishes the request for a concession.  All other parties, who deem the request might 
cause interference, have twenty days to challenge a license request to the SIGET.  4) 
Within ten days, the SIGET must hold a hearing for all parties involved in a concession 
request.  5) During the waiting period, the SIGET’s Manager of Telecommunications 
performs a technical evaluation of the concession application.  6) The concession is 
granted with Manager of Telecommunications approval.  If there are multiple requests for 
the same concession, the SIGET will auction the concession within sixty days. 
(3)  Annual Fee.  The Telecommunications law stipulates that an 
annual fee is required in order to maintain a concession.   According to the law, a base 
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rate is determined by multiplying the bandwidth by the transmission power, multiplied by 
a service factor.  The service factor is determined by the position of the concession within 
the spectrum band.136 
(4)  Dispute Process.  The telecommunications laws do not specify 
a formal complaint process.  The SIGET is the authority for handling all disputes.  Under 
their new laws, illegal electromagnetic transmission is considered a serious infraction and 
daily fines can be imposed.  There are very few reports of signal interference following 
the reforms in El Salvador.137 
2. Guatemala 
In 1996, Guatemala established sweeping reforms in their spectrum allocation 
policy with the passage of the Ley General de Telecommunicaciones.  Prior to this, there 
were two separate office that managed spectrum policies.  One office regulated the 
spectrum below 800 MHz and another office made the decisions for the spectrum above 
800 MHz.  These licenses were free of charge and the demand for licenses far 
outweighed the supply.  A black market arose where bribery and side payments were 
required to obtain licenses. 
The new policy allowed for radio waves to be available for the use of those who 
requested them for a stated purpose.  “The basic building block of Guatemala’s approach 
to spectrum is that all spectrum not currently assigned to users can be requested by any 
person.”138  The government issues usufractory rights for spectrum use.  In usufractory 
rights, 
holders exercise exclusive rights of the radio spectrum in question.  This 
includes the right to change spectrum use over time, and to subdivide and 
transfer rights, subject only to minimal technical limitations, international 
agreements to which Guatemala is a signatory, and consistency with 
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general frequency allocations established by the International 
Telecommunications Union for the Americas.139 
The licenses in Guatemala are issued as Titulos de Usufructo Frequencia (TUF), 
which may be leased, sold, subdivided, or consolidated for a period of fifteen years.  The 
spectrum can be used as the holder of the TUF wants.  In the United States, the regulatory 
agency dictates the specific technology that can be used in a given spectrum; “a market 
for radio spectrum is excluded by regulatory restrictions.  In contrast, Guatemala’s 
reforms enable such a market to emerge.”140 
a. The Elements of Guatemalan Reform 
The following section highlights key aspects of the Guatemalan allocation 
structure. 
(1)  Superintendent of Telecommunicationes (SIT).  The SIT is the 
administrator to enforce specific rules.  “The SIT is empowered to respond to private 
claims for spectrum access, and to adjudicate disputes over airwave rights.  It may also 
engage in related activities, such as spectrum monitoring.”141  It should be noted that the 
SIT is susceptible to political pressure. 
(2)  Titulo Usufructo de Frequencia (TUF).  A Guatemalan TUF 
contains six basic variables:  frequency, hour of operation, maximum transmitted power, 
maximum power emitted at the border of adjacent frequencies, geographic territory, and 
the duration of the right.142  Existing commercial users received TUFs and two other 
categories of users were created:  government use and amateur authorizations.  A TUF 
may be employed however the owner wants so long as the technical parameters of the 
TUF are obeyed. 
                                                 
139 Thomas W. Hazlett, Giancarlo Ibarguen, and Wayne Leighton.  “Property Rights to Radio 
Spectrum in Guatemala and El Salvador:  An Experiment in Liberalization.”  Journal of Law and 
Economics 3.2 (2007):  442. 
140 Ibid., 443. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid., 444. 
 63 
(3)  Application Process.  The application process for a TUF in 
Guatemala is a seven step process:  1) An applicant applies to the SIT for the right to use 
a frequency band under the TUF.  2) The SIT has three days to accept, reject, or declare 
the application incomplete.  3) If the application is accepted, a public notification is 
issued.  Anyone opposed to the issuance may file a formal complaint.  4) The SIT 
adjudicates the validity of the complaints within ten days.  5) If the SIT declares the 
application valid, all interested parties are allowed to file claims for the TUF.  6) If there 
are no competing claims for the TUF, the petitioner receives the right for free.  7) If there 
are competing claims, an auction is held within thirty-five days and the TUF is issued to 
the highest bidder. 
(4)  Dispute Process (For Interference Complaints). TUF holders 
submit a formal complaint, with accompanied technical report, to the SIT in the event of 
a dispute regarding a TUF.  The SIT then will notify the accused party that an 
interference complaint has been filed against them.  The accused party then has ten days 
to file a technical report in response to the accusations against them.  The SIT will then 
issue a decision within ten days resolving the dispute.  If there is a ruling of fault, the 
party at fault has five days to cease transmission and pay appropriate fines.143 
There are very few reports of signal interference.  However, 
Guatemala has an issue with unauthorized broadcast by religious groups in the FM 
spectrum.  The organizations claim they have the freedom to transmit without restrictions 
imposed by the government.  The courts have agreed with the groups.  Guatemalan law 
constrains the regulators and there is lack of confidence in the SIT to handle disputes.144 
3. Analysis of Real World Performance 
Analyzing Guatemala’s and El Salvador’s performance in the wireless industry 
provides an opportunity to examine the results of property-rights as a basis for spectrum 
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allocation.  Thomas Hazlett attempts to prove that the application of property-rights in 
allocating spectrum results in an increase in available spectrum to mobile carriers, more 
competition amongst carriers, lower retail prices for mobile phone services, and an 
increase in mobile phone output. 
The analysis compares data from the sixteen Latin American countries between 
2000 and 2004.  Hazlett’s analysis “indicate[s] that liberal spectrum policies are 
positively related to increased spectrum deployment by mobile carriers and to increased 
competition (lower industry concentration) among them.  Spectrum liberalization is also 
positively related to output in the mobile telephony sector (minutes of use) and with 
lower retail prices.”145 
a. Spectrum Use 
Figure 5 compares the amount of spectrum utilized versus the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of the country. 
 
Figure 5.   Spectrum Utilization in Central America146 
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The second graph, below, in figure 6 displays the results of the amount of spectrum used 
per thousand dollars of GDP.  It shows that the liberalization policies in Guatemala and 
El Salvador have led to more use of the electromagnetic spectrum. 
 
Figure 6.   Spectrum Utilization vs. GDP in Central America147 
Hazlett’s statistical analysis of spectrum use determines that, “spectrum liberalization on 
average increases the bandwidth available to mobile networks by 16.02 MHz per 
$thousand GDP per capita” and that “the evidence then supports the hypothesis that 
liberal property rules are associated with greater bandwidth being made available.”148 
b. Competition 
In order to calculate the effects of liberalization on competition in the 
Latin American market, Hazlett calculates the Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices (HHI) as 
computed from shares of mobile telephone revenues.  HHI is a commonly accepted 
measure of market concentration.  The HHI increases as the number of firms in the 
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market decreases.149  Hazlett infers that the number of firms in the communications 
market can be directly related to the amount of competition.  The HHI of all sixteen Latin 
Americas is displayed in figure 7.  A lower HHI value indicates markets with more 
competition.  The low HHI values for Guatemala and El Salvador indicate that their 
wireless communications markets have higher levels of competition. 
 
Figure 7.   Measure of Competition in Latin American Wireless Communications 
Market150 
The graph shows that Guatemala and El Salvador have relatively low HHI against all 
other Latin American nations.  “Liberalization decreases HHI.”151 
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c. Price 
The results of the analysis for price fail to provide conclusive results about 
the effects of liberalization on the associated costs in the marketplace.  Data used for the 
calculations in this analysis shows a statistically insignificant increase or decrease 
associated with the average. 
d. Output 
Output is analyzed by looking at the total minutes of use (MOU) per 
person.  The graph, shown in figure 8, shows the results of the MOU per $thousand GDP 
per capita. 
 
Figure 8.   Wireless Use vs. GDP in Central America152 
“Dividing the MOU per person by GDP per capita, we can see that Guatemala is 
significantly and El Salvador is slightly above the 14-country average.”153  This result 
shows that liberalization of the cellular telephone markets in Guatemala and El Salvador 
have led to an increased number of minutes of use per capita.  The results are statistically 
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significant and point directly to the fact that the liberalized policies have improved the 
wireless communications market to benefit the consumer. 
e. Summary of Results 
Results of the analysis of the performance of spectrum allocation in the 
Guatemalan and El Salvadorian marketplace showed statistically important results.  
According to the analysis, liberalization in the spectrum allocation policies of Guatemala 
and El Salvador resulted in increases in spectrum use, competition, and output.  “The 
empirical evidence gleaned from mobile telephone markets, while preliminary, broadly 
supports the Coasean conjecture that decentralized property-rights were relatively 
efficient mechanisms for policing spectrum resource use.”154 
The limited data supplied by Guatemala and El Salvador suggest that there 
are economic benefits for liberal spectrum policies.  “We find that private spectrum rights 
yields wireless phone markets that perform relatively efficiently, in terms of outputs and 
prices, suggesting consumer welfare gains from liberalization.”155 
F. DEREGULATION 
Before proposing an allocation scheme for spectrum, it is important to take a look 
at some lessons learned in relaxing the regulations in other industries.  This section 
highlights the benefits of regulation as well as some possible pitfalls in implementing 
new policies.  The final part of this section presents a set of guidelines for creating and 
establishing a thriving industry with minimal restrictions. 
“Since the 1970s, deregulation has succeeded in increasing overall economic 
welfare and sharply reducing prices, generally by about 30 percent, for transportation - 
including air travel, rail transportation, and trucking - and for natural gas and 
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telecommunications [in the United States].”156 However, it seems that there are an equal 
number of successes and pathetic failures when it comes to deregulation.  There have 
been successes in the airline, railroad, and northeastern electricity industries.  
Deregulating the California electric industry was a failure.  It resulted in “locking-in” 
higher consumer rates for ten years.  In the telecommunications industry, the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 cost millions of dollars in lobbying and litigation and 
resulted in an unimproved marketplace for consumers.157  
 Although the results are not always as intended, “a wider assault against 
myriad forms of inefficient government markets - beyond classic ‘regulation’ - is more 
urgently needed.”158 The successful implementation of a deregulation scheme requires an 
understanding of what conditions lead to success and what leads to failure.  The 
government should reduce interference in markets, including spectrum allocation, and 
focus on maximizing the value of the assets on the open market. 
1. Benefits of Deregulation 
Success in regulation is achieved by maximizing the utility or welfare.  There are 
two benchmarks to use in determining success in deregulation.  First, compare the current 
condition of the industry to the state of the industry before deregulation.  Second, ask 
“what would the current state of the industry be if deregulation had been blocked?”  Just 
about every deregulated industry has seen increased efficiency and improved quality of 
service. 
In virtually every deregulated industry, there have been substantial gains 
in efficiency.  The firms supplying the service - new entrants and 
incumbents alike - produce it at costs about 30 percent lower than would 
have been incurred under the old regulatory regime.  In addition, service 
quality tends to improve.  Deregulation reduced airline fares, trucking 
costs, and railroad transportation costs by about $35 billion per year (in 
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1995 dollars), largely through improvements in efficiency.  Similarly, 
reductions in long-distance telephone rates came about because of 
improved efficiency and the FCCs more efficient pricing of interstate 
carrier access, not from reduced telephone company profits.159 
Table 4 illustrates the results achieved through deregulating several industries. 
 
Table 4.   Effects of Deregulation160 
a. Industries that Remain Regulated 
Numerous government sectors of private industry remain under some 
government control of prices and output.  The housing industry retains certain rent 
controls.  Government heavily subsidizes mortgage financing.  The agriculture industry 
contains price supports and marketing agreements.  Imported metals and chemicals are 
still governed by the 1974 Trade Act.  Highways and roads are supported by provisions; 
health care fees are regulated; and the government still controls a large share of the 
valuable electromagnetic spectrum.161 
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b. Industries Needing Reform 
The most important sectors that remain under government regulations are 
telecommunications, electricity, and air transportation. 
(1)  Telecommunications.  Although cellular markets and voice-
over-IP (VOIP) services have introduced more competition into the phone markets, the 
FCC continues to provisison access to local and small business customers.  They 
essentially control the pricing policies for local and long distance coverage.  Full 
deregulation in the telecommunications industry would minimize the barriers to both 
entry and investment into the telecommunications industry.  Full deregulation could 
result in $7 billion savings per year to the customers with the elimination of inefficient 
pricing of local and long distance services.162 
(2)  Internet. With the increasing amount of services provided over 
the internet, additional investment is required to keep up with the expanding traffic loads.  
Government imposed “Network neutrality” eliminates tiered pricing schemes in 
providing internet access.  Any policy governing internet pricing schemes would be 
premature and counterproductive.  There are enough Internet Service Providers (ISP) in 
the marketplace that one company cannot exploit the market through discriminatory 
pricing policies. 
(3)  Electricity.  The generation of electricity has been greatly 
deregulated and the market is competitive; however, transmission and distribution of 
electrical power remain as monopolies.  Deregulation of the electric industry could result 
in similar increases in competition as the telecommunications industry has seen. 
Robert Crandall warns about careful implementation of future 
attempts to deregulate the electric industry.  California’s attempt to deregulate their 
electric industry resulted in an additional $12 billion annual increase in costs to the 
consumer.163  He urges caution when creating a deregulated electricity market, but 
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believes that an increased number of small scale providers and increased generation could 
prove to be beneficial to the customers.  However, a successful deregulation of the 
electric industry will require vast investment in transmission capability. 
(4)  Air Transportation.  Regulations in the air transportation 
industry continue to place restrictions on domestic carriers abroad and unnecessary 
restrictions on foreign carriers domestically.  These regulations block increased 
competition in the markets.  The federal government manages the air traffic control 
system in the United States.  There are large potential gains in liberalizing policies across 
the air transportation industry. 
(5)  Electromagnetic Spectrum. “While few regulated industries 
remain to be deregulated, federal and state government policies affect prices of a number 
of resources and could be relaxed or at least reformed.”164  Recently spectrum rights have 
been auctioned off for commercial purposes, but this represents only a small portion of 
the available spectrum.  “The potential gains from freeing the remaining spectrum from 
government management - particularly that set aside for defense, public safety, and 
broadcasting - are extremely large.  Were this spectrum allocated through market 
mechanisms, substantial economic value could be created.”165  The 400 MHz television 
bands could produce a net gain of $8 billion in higher valued use.  “A total shift to a 
market allocation of spectrum would obviously unleash enormous value.”166 
2. Discussion of Deregulation 
“Deregulation and market design are such complex and multifaceted exercises 
that their success or failure clearly depends on multiple factors.”167 
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a. Characteristics of Failed Deregulation 
Eugene Bardach identifies the characteristics of failed deregulation 
policies in his paper, “Why Deregulation Succeeds or Fails.”  He identifies four distinct 
characteristics of flawed policies:  protectionism, crowded and prolonged process, 
ideological incompetence, and avoiding blame. 
Protectionism in deregulation involves the prior regulating agence not 
participating towards achieving the goal of a deregulated market.  Bardach describes it as 
the “government protecting its own market competition, arguably to the detriment of the 
public.”168 
Deregulated markets require a varying need for secondary regulation or 
phase-two regulation.  This is caused from issues being inadequately defined in the initial 
deregulation scheme:  ambiguous or imcomplete property-rights, residual natural 
monopolies, externalities, and information asymmetries.169  “However benign the 
motivation, the longer that second phase intervention continues, the longer it remains a 
target for rent seeking and other such distorting forces.”170  Good design and luck 
minimize the amount of handholds required to complete thed deregulation process.  
Handholds, or additional regulations, increases the likelihood that complete deregulation 
will stall.171 
Decisions by the regulators can doom the deregulation efforts.  In the 
British pension reform, a combination of the implemented policies and additional tax 
incentives combined to produce negative market results.  Eventually, it resulted in a more 
regulated industry than existed at the beginning of the process.  The Canadien Radio and 
Telecommunications Commission incompetently installed price floors for the 
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implementation of VoIP service.  The focus should have been placed on forcing prices 
downward.  This resulted in failed deregulation.172 
b. Practical Implementation of Deregulation 
The most harmful condition to implementing deregulated policies is the 
government having a high stake in the success or failure in the deregulation effort.  
“There may be at least four ways in which this condition can be avoided, minimized, or at 
least managed:  shrink or neutralize the bureaucracy, absorb moral casualties, get most of 
it right the first time, and create countervailling constituencies.”173 
(1)  Shrinking or Neutralizing the Bureaucracy.  Effective 
deregulation requires destroying the bureaucratic niches.  This “limits the capacity of 
important government stakeholders to intervene detrimentally in phase-two politics.”174 
(2)  Absorbing Moral Casualties.  Removing regulations is not 
beneficial to all parties involved.  Deregulation, typically, has winners and losers.  “The 
government’s desire to buffer the deserving victims of deregulatory transitions is morally 
admirable as well as politically prudent.  But the buffering policies typically create 
opportunities for meddling of all kinds, including the revival of rent seeking.”175  
However, it may be necessary to implement some buffering policies as long as it does not 
affect the long term competitive pricing. 
(3)  Get It Right the First Time.  Well-planned deregulation should 
aim to avoid the need to implement a second-phase of deregulation.  The need for a 
second-phase can be minimized with well defined and planned implementation of 
deregulation policies.  This is not an easy accomplishment with the number of 
uncertainties and complexities in the market. 
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(4)  Creating Countervailing Constituencies.  Government 
meddling in deregulation may not be possible to prevent.  One way to counter the 
government’s desire to get involved is to “create new constituencies to oppose it.”176  
The ultimate goal would be to “create a set of investors and workers with a stake in 
pressuring the government ‘not to renege on its deregulatory plans.’”177 
c. Deregulation Success 
The success of deregulation may hinge on the elimination of the two-
phase problem where ineffective regulation leads to re-regulation efforts and eventually 
full regulated policies again. 
I am a little more confident of the proposition that when government or 
policymakers have high stakes in deregulation or intervening in phase-two 
markets, their actions often lead, directly or indirectly, to failure.  This is 
not because the evidence is so rich or supportive but because the 
proposition is but an application of the more general theory that the 
process of government is vulnerable to a variety of hazards such as rent 
seeking, ideological zealotry, legalism, slow-paced bureaucracy, and the 
piling on of objectives and agendas.178 
G. CHAPTER REVIEW 
This chapter outlined some of the leading ideas about how to improve spectrum 
allocation.  They all emphasize implementing property-rights to best allocate spectrum.  
The empirical evidence from establishing property-rights schemes in Guatemala and El 
Salvador supports implementing a market-based allocation scheme.  The final part of this 
section detailed the benefits of removing unnecessary obstacles in other industries, the 
possible benefits of deregulating spectrum, and a blueprint for any deregulation policies.   
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The next chapter builds on these ideas to propose an allocation scheme that takes 




V. LEASED RIGHTS IN SPECTRUM ALLOCATION 
This chapter presents an allocation scheme that promotes innovation of more 
efficient use of the spectrum.  First, the chapter defines the lease and the rights associated 
with the lease.  The final two sections define the role of the administrative agency in 
implementing the scheme and the efficient dispute resolution process. 
The most important factor in creating a successful spectrum allocation scheme is 
establishing clear definitions and rules associated with the allocated asset.  In this case, 
analysis of the proposed time, area, and spectrum scheme of Arthur De Vany and the 
allocation systems implemented in Guatemala and El Salvador served as the foundation 
for the definition of rights in this proposal. 
A. OVERVIEW OF THE ALLOCATION SCHEME 
A system of leased rights retains the ownership of spectrum with the government 
and takes advantage of free-market forces to efficiently allocate spectrum.  The current 
impasse in the spectrum allocation debate, between proponents of property-rights and the 
supporters of a regulation model, is a clear definition of what exactly is being allocated.  
It boils down to whether it is the ether through which transmissions occur or the right to 
transmit through that ether?  This proposal eliminates the inhibitions associated with a 
property-rights scheme while unleashing the full benefits of the market to improve 
efficiency and innovation in wireless technologies by allocating spectrum leases. 
B. LEASED RIGHTS 
The lease is treated like property since possession of the lease allows for transfer 
of rights and sub-leasing of the associated portion of leased spectrum.  It imposes no 
restrictions on the types of equipment that can be used or the transmitted power.  Instead, 
it imposes a limit on the level of the signal that is measured at the geographic and spectral 
boundaries of the lease.  The elimination of unnecessary restrictions on type of equipment 
and transmitter power results in better use of the allocated spectrum by leaseholders. 
 78 
Characteristic Specification 
Time of Allowable 
Transmission 
24 hour period 
Geographic Area National lease 
Spectrum 27 separate 100 MHz frequency bands 
  
• Excludes government allocated and unlicensed 
bands 
  
• Leaseholder must honor previous agreements 
that are property of the lease 
Lease Duration 15 year duration 
Interference 
Protection 
Maximum field strength measured at geographic and 
spectrum boundaries  
Sub-Lease 
Agreements • Time period may be modified 
  • Geographic area may be modified as desired 
  
• Spectrum modifications may be made as long 
as all primary interference protection limits are 
observed 
  
• Secondary modifications are limited to fifteen 
years in duration 
  
• All secondary modifications must satisfy 
established limits of primary lease  
Table 5.   Spectrum Lease Properties 
Table 5 illustrates the properties of each lease in this allocation scheme.  Primary 
leases contain six operating characteristics that ensure orderly transmission continues in 
the commercially available bands of spectrum.  Six factors provide exclusivity and 
outline the leaseholder’s broadcast rules in order to provide for safe and orderly 





1. Leaseholder Rights 
1)  Leaseholder is granted flexible rights for fifteen years to a 100 MHz band of 
total spectrum.  Available spectrum for immediate use excludes government allocated 
spectrum, established unlicensed bands, and previous modifications that are property of 
the lease. 
2)  Leaseholder has full flexibility to make sub-lease agreements within the 
primary time, area, and spectrum constraints of the lease. 
 
3)  Maximum length of sub-lease agreements shall not exceed fifteen years. 
 
4)  All sub-lease conditions are property of the lease and must be honored 
following the transfer of a lease. 
 
5)  Leases are for nationwide transmission within the spectrum band, subject to 
exclusion of areas where there is government allocated spectrum, unlicensed spectrum, or 
previous modification to the lease. 
 
6)  Interference protection is provided by establishing an acceptable maximum 
electromagnetic field strength for all transmissions at the geographic and spectral 
boundaries. 
 
7)  All secondary lease modifications will be recorded with the agency tasked 
with administrative oversight of this scheme. 
The following sections provide the background for determining the parameters for 
this lease allocation scheme. 
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a. Time 
Primary leases will specify the allowed broadcast time for the lease over 
the entire twenty-four hour period of the day.  Allocating primary leases for the entire day 
provides the most flexibility to the leaseholder.  Sub-lease agreements by the leaseholder 
may be made to divide their leased spectrum into smaller time allocations.  All sub-lease 
conditions must be reported for accurate maintenance of the allocated leases; the 
collecting authority is discussed later in the chapter. 
b. Geographic Area 
Each lease identifies a location where transmission is authorized and in 
this scheme each primary license will be valid for the entire country.  Initial broadcast 
area is subject to previous agreements in the lease as well as exclusion zones where the 
spectrum is allocated by the government or put aside for unlicensed use.  In order to 
maximize the flexibility granted to the leaseholder, the area allocated to the primary 
leaseholder is maximized through a national lease.  The lease provides full flexibility to 
the primary leaseholder to make any secondary modifications and provisions to divide the 
lease into smaller geographic areas.  The ability for the leaseholders to modify their 
leases through open-market transactions will provide incentive for the leaseholder to 
make decisions that will maximize the value of their lease. 
c. Spectrum Block 
The electromagnetic spectrum between 300 MHz and 3 GHz encompasses 
2,700 MHz of total spectrum available for allocation.  This scheme allocates twenty-
seven equal bands of 100 MHz total.  Spectrum that is immediately available for use 
varies from lease to lease and is subject to all previous agreements and excludes NTIA 
allocated spectrum and unlicensed spectrum bands. 
 81 
As of 2002, 438 MHz of the UHF spectrum was unencumbered and 
available for immediate restructuring and use.179    On average, each 100 MHz block of 
leased spectrum would contain approximately 16% of the spectrum that is available for 
immediate employment. 
The UHF frequency band provides ideal operating characteristics for 
current mobile services.  In 1994, the FCC dedicated the spectrum between 1,850 MHz 
and 1,990 MHz for implementation of nationwide Personal Communication Services 
(PCS).  Each block size contained 10-30 MHz.180  Today’s cutting edge mobile 
technologies are implemented using third-generation (3G) mobile services.  
Implementation of 3G requires 15-20 MHz of spectrum.181  In this allocation scheme, the 
goal is to provide for 15-20 MHz of unallocated spectrum in each lease in order to be 
large enough to implement valuable technologies, but also small enough to take 
advantage of a competitive market.  Since approximately 16% of the UHF band is 
available, leases of 100 MHz blocks of spectrum will provide, on average, 15-20 MHz of 
initially available spectrum.  This scheme proposes allocation of twenty-seven exclusive 
frequency bands that excludes only the NTIA allocated spectrum and spectrum dedicated 
to unlicensed use in those bands.  It follows the “Swiss cheese” model used in 
implementing PCS in the mid-1990s.182 
Unlike in Kwerel and Williams’ proposal, this scheme allows current 
exclusive rights use licensees to be granted the flexibility to make agreements with 
primary leaseholders for continued use.  At the end of the current license, the license will 
be merged into the property of the primary lease.  Eventually, the only exclusions to 
complete unencumbered spectrum available to the leaseholders in the UHF spectrum will 
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be the frequencies used by the NTIA and unlicensed use.  The idea of protecting the 
unlicensed spectrum is similar to the government allocation of property for public parks. 
d. Lease Duration 
Each primary lease will expire after a fifteen-year period and be re-
allocated.  Sub-lease agreements become the property of the lease, however any sub-lease 
agreement is limited to 15 years in duration.  Future leaseholders must recognize previous 
agreements; but, by limiting the secondary duration agreements to fifteen years, it 
provides flexibility to the leaseholder to decide how to effectively allocate their entire 
piece of their leased spectrum.  
Fifteen-year lease durations provide enough time for leaseholders to 
implement their desired technologies in order to take full advantage of the allocated 
spectrum band.  Conversely, the fifteen-year period ensures continued competition in the 
market for the allocated leases.  Constant competition for the primary leases provides the 
necessary incentives for leaseholders to best utilize their spectrum. 
e. Maximum Power at the Boundary 
Establishing limited electromagnetic field strength at both geographic and 
spectral boundaries provides interference protection.  The allocated licenses in this 
scheme are nationwide and contain no geographic boundary with other leaseholder, but 
as explained later in this chapter, will have to obey previously granted or government 
protected rights within their lease.  The level of transmission at the border may be 
modified according to the realistic broadcast environment.  If interference levels are 
unacceptable, the level of acceptable field strength at the border may be modified through 
consensual agreement, administrative recommendation, or judicial order.  By imposing 
transmission restrictions at the boundaries, it creates an orderly system for successful 
spectrum management while maintaining a minimal amount of enforcement costs. 
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f. Sub-lease Agreements 
In order to maximize the potential market benefits for spectral allocation, 
the scheme must allow maximum flexibility to the leaseholder.  Although it is not a 
property-rights proposal, the ability to make sub-lease agreements provides the 
leaseholder the same benefits as a property-rights scheme. 
Along with the primary modifications as outlined above, the leaseholder 
may make arrangements to create a secondary level of spectrum allocation within their 
lease.  The leaseholder is allowed to make agreements, within their leased spectrum, in 
the following characteristics of the lease:  time of allowed transmission, geographic 
location, permitted frequency for transmission, duration of the agreement, and maximum 
field strength allowed at the secondary boundaries.  All sub-lease conditions must satisfy 
the primary permissions of the lease. 
In order to maintain a system of orderly broadcast, sub-lease modifications 
must be recorded with an agency to maintain a record of all agreements.  Technical 
analysis of disputes and judicial review will be based upon the records maintained in the 
database.  The accuracy of the database is essential in maintaining a chaos free 
broadcasting environment.  A method of encouraging reporting would be necessary in 
order to ensure leaseholders keep the administrative body informed of the current 
conditions of their lease.  All of the sub-lease agreements will be bound to the primary 
lease and must be honored by subsequent leaseholders should possession of the lease be 
transferred. 
2. Lease Examples 
This section provides two simplified examples of how the lease allocation scheme 
works.  The leases are provided as examples and do not represent the current allocation of 
the spectrum bands they represent.  Each lease consists of exactly 100 MHz of spectrum.  
The spectrum, at the beginning of the lease, is either encumbered or unencumbered.  The 
unencumbered bands are available for immediate use.  The encumbered spectrum has 
been allocated previously.  Encumbered spectrum consists of two types of allocation:  
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government allocated spectrum, and spectrum that has been allocated and is under an 
existing agreement.  As discussed in the previous section, all spectrum under previous 
agreement will become possession of the lease upon termination of the agreement and 
government allocated spectrum will remain under government possession. 
a. Lease A 
Figure 9 is a visual representation of a chunk of leased spectrum between 
2300 and 2400 MHz. 
 
Figure 9.   Example Lease A 
There are four government-allocated bands and four commercially allocated bands.  
Initially, there is 25 MHz of unencumbered spectrum for immediate use.  Within the first 
eight years, all previous agreements for commercially allocated spectrum will expire, 
providing 25 MHz of additional spectrum for use by the leaseholder.  50 MHz will 
remain allocated by the government, but by the end of the first lease cycle, lease A will 
provide the leaseholder with 50 MHz of spectrum for allocation however they wish. 
b. Lease B 
Figure 10 is a visual representation of a piece of leased spectrum between 
2500 and 2600 MHz. 
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Figure 10.   Example Lease B 
Example lease B has three bands of government allocated spectrum, totaling 60 MHz.  
There is only one 10 MHz band allocated through previous commercial agreement.  
Initially, lease B provides more immediately available spectrum than lease A, but more of 
lease B is exempt from the lease because the government retains it.  At the beginning of 
the lease, 30 MHz is available for immediate employment, but only 10 MHz becomes 
available over the duration of the lease.  Although this band initially has more available 
spectrum available than lease A, by the end of the first lease cycle, lease B will only have 
40 MHz of spectrum available, compared to 50 MHz available in lease A.  
C. DEFINITION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 
This system does not require a regulating body.  It requires an administrative 
agency to implement and oversee the lease-rights.  Additional responsibilities include 
technical and economic analysis of interference disputes and technical advisor to the 
Judicial System. 
Use of the electromagnetic spectrum required strict regulation in the late 1920s in 
order to clean up a chaotic industry.  However, the FCC has proven over the years to 
have inhibited innovations and create unnecessary barriers to new technologies.  
Although the 1996 Telecommunications Act attempted to eliminate the FCC’s 
technology retardation problem, the FCC remains a bureaucratic system that creates 
unnecessary obstacles to new technologies in wireless communications. 
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Modern equipment and better technical knowledge make it possible to implement 
a system that loosens restrictions and creates an atmosphere that promotes investment and 
competition in the commercial spectrum.  Former FCC Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-
Roth, who was with the FCC during the implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications 
Act, claims that the current structure of the FCC does not allow it to adequately regulate 
effectively.  This scheme does not require spectrum regulation but administrative 
oversight.   It provides judicially backed enforcement power to issue economically and 
technically sound recommendations in interference disputes and a method of quick 
resolution to detrimental interference. 
Lease-rights require an administrative system that is free of both bureaucratic 
limitations and political pressure.  The FCC does not have a good track record at being 
able to promote efficiency in the use of the electromagnetic spectrum.  The 
Telecommunications Act attempted to improve the performance of the FCC, but the 
established government agency has continued to hinder growth.  For this scheme to work, 
a new administrative agency should be created without the bureaucratic issues and 
limitations of the current FCC. 
1. Administrative Duties 
There are five administrative duties required to implement this lease-rights 
system.  A separate agency is required to implement the policies associated with the 
scheme and needs to be created.  As Harold Furchtgott-Roth points out in his book, A 
Tough Act to Follow?, the FCC has too much power and cannot adequately perform all of 
its duties.  Therefore, in order to adequately perform the required tasks, it is important to 
limit the responsibilities and authority of a new agency to an administrate role and to 
provide advice on matters of technology. 
The first administrative duty is to create the leases to be allocated.  There will be 
twenty-seven exclusive leases of equal 100 MHz blocks for the frequency band 300 MHz 
through 3 GHz.  Efficient utilization of the leases will occur following allocation through 
consensual agreement amongst leaseholders.  This system encourages maximum utility of 
the allocated spectrum. 
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Secondly, the agency is required to allocate the leases in its possession.  This is 
not only for newly created leases, but also for defaulted and expired leases.  The current 
auction system evolved following studies of game theory and through practical 
implementation.183  The auction system is devised so it is fair to every one involved.  
There was no evidence discovered in researching this project that provided any type of 
conclusive evidence that the auction system is flawed.  Therefore, it would also serve as 
an excellent allocation tool in any new scheme. 
The rollout of this allocation scheme must maintain continuity of service.  The 
unassigned spectrum will be released into the market through an orderly lease distribution 
auction process.  A ten-year process for allocating the twenty-seven bands maintains the 
current level of operability while infusing the leased spectrum.  It also establishes an 
annual cycle of two to three primary license auctions.  Defaulted licenses will be 
auctioned off within one year of default collection and each primary license will be 
auctioned three years prior to expiration of the lease to allow for winning leaseholders to 
transition into the responsibilities as the primary leaseholder and for those losing their 
lease to execute contingency plans for losing their lease. 
A major responsibility of the administrative agency is to collect the annual tariffs 
associated with the lease.  The annual tariff is the amount of the winning bid over the 
period of the lease.  The collected income serves as both operating revenue for the 
administrative agency and income to the Treasury. 
The agency will be assigned the important task of maintaining the database of 
current allocation.  Similar to the OET’s current role at the FCC for maintaining 
allocation table, the agency will be charged with recording all sub-lease agreements.  The 
database will provide the accurate information from which technical and economic 
analysis will be performed in interference disputes.  The judicial branch will also be 
provided with information to base a ruling from this database.  Accuracy will be 
imperative. 
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A final issue is when to perform the auction for expired leases.  Primary 
leaseholders will be able to bid to renew their lease against competition.  For this reason, 
leaseholders may lose their operating license.  The expiration auction needs to be held 
prior to the expiration of the lease in order to provide an adequate period for a business to 
execute contingency planning prior to lease expiration. 
2. Advisory Duties 
The role of the administrative agency in implementing this allocation scheme is 
not only limited to administering the leases, but to provide highly technical analysis when 
needed.  The agency will be required to render their technical and economic opinion 
during the interference resolution process or as requested by the judicial system. 
The agency must have the technical experience and knowledge as if it was 
regulating the airwaves completely.  The NTIA will continue to allocate government 
spectrum and the FCC’s role in spectrum management will dissolve.  A new 
administrative agency will be created in order to implement the new lease-rights scheme.  
There will be one oversight role for the agency and that will be to protect the government 
spectrum bands from all interference.  The spectrum used for emergency 
communications, navigation, and distress signals must be insured to be free from harmful 
interference from the commercially allocated spectrum.  If harmful interference threatens 
a vital service within the government allocated spectrum the agency has the authority to 
issue an order to the harmful emitter to cease transmitting.  This order should only be 
valid for a short period, likely twenty-four to forty-eight hours and must be validated by a 
judge.  This is the only area where the administrative agency will possess the authority to 
render judgment on leaseholders.  All other judgments will originate from the judicial 
system. 
3. Dispute Resolution Process 
Due to the physical nature of spectrum and the shared transmission medium, the 
ability to transmit effectively can be easily disrupted.  A major flaw with the current FCC 
spectrum regulation is the apparent lack of urgency in rendering decisions.  Philip Weiser 
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and Dale Hatfield highlighted a huge concern in their spectrum rights proposal.  Any new 
proposal for spectrum allocation must be able to minimize the effects of harmful 
interference or the industry will lose confidence in the scheme and eventually lead to 
failure.  This scheme builds upon the successful cooperation that has been exhibited in 
the unlicensed spectrum bands and adds a swift, three-tiered resolution process that will, 
“competently define and enforce [leaseholders] rights against interference.”184 
a. Three-Tiered Resolution Process 
This lease-rights scheme specifies a three-step process towards 
interference resolution.  This three-tiered resolution strategy provides an efficient system 
to minimize the occurrence of harmful interference.  The process involves direct 
negotiations between leaseholders, an administrative resolution that includes technical 
and economic analysis, and finally litigation within the judicial system. 
(1)  Leaseholder Agreement.  Under this lease-rights scheme, 
resolution of interference disputes is encouraged amongst leaseholders.  Unlike the 
current command-and-control system of the FCC, in this system direct negotiations 
among the leaseholders is allowed and highly encouraged.  Any mutually agreed 
resolutions must be reported with the administrative agency.  This process ensures 
accurate records are kept for the purposes of administrative resolution and judicial 
enforcement. 
(2)  Administrative Proposal.  Should a matter of dispute be 
registered with the administrative agency, the administrative body will perform a timely 
analysis of the dispute.  The administrative proposal is meant for the purpose of a neutral 
observer to provide a proposed resolution based on the facts of the dispute.  In order to 
avoid the problems associated with an extremely long wait for a bureaucratic response, 
the proposal must be issued by the agency in a timely manner, most likely within a few 
weeks. 
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The agency’s issued proposal is not binding and must be agreed 
upon by all parties for adoption.  As stated earlier, the administrative agency lacks 
enforcement authority in resolution disputes unless it is a matter of harmful interference 
to a vital government allocated channel. 
The creation of the administrative proposal serves two purposes.  It 
not only provides a neutral recommendation for resolution, but also an outline for the 
judicial system to follow should the matter become litigious. 
(3)  Judicial System Resolution.  The final step towards resolving 
disputes between leaseholders is to ask a court for judgment.  This final step is the same 
method that would be used to resolve disputes over actual land and rights associated with 
property.  If the matter is not resolved through mutual agreement or adoption of the 
proposal for resolution, the judicial system will impose a ruling.  As Coase wrote, “one of 
the purposes of the legal system is to establish the clear delimitation of rights on the basis 
of which transfer and recombination of rights can take place through the market.”185 
b. Efficient Resolution 
Unlike the current command-and-control regulation of spectrum, this 
lease-rights allocation scheme provides a method for efficient resolution of disputes.  It 
provides an answer for interference concerns that could cause loss of confidence in the 
scheme and it does it in a highly efficient manner.  The three-tiered dispute process 
provides swift resolution at the lowest practical level of involvement.   
Through the history of the FCC, there is an abundance of evidence that 
alludes to decisions being rendered based upon lobbying or political influence.  In the 
application of property-rights in El Salvador the system allows for political pressure to 
impact decisions involving spectrum.186  The lease-rights system minimizes the benefit to 
the lobbyists and politicians to impact the spectrum market.  The administrative agency 
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lacks enforcement power and the system relies upon mutual agreement among users or 
the legal system in rendering decisions.  The role of the administrative agency is to issue 
a proposal based on a technical and economic analysis of the dispute.  If the proposal is 
fair, the leaseholders can adopt the proposal as resolution.  In this scheme, the 
government has the capability to create a lease scheme to allocate the spectrum and not 
manipulate it. 
D. CHAPTER REVIEW 
This chapter laid out the rules, rights, administrative requirements, and dispute 
resolution process for a lease-rights scheme.  This lease scheme allows the marketplace to 
most efficiently allocate the available spectrum and maximizes the amount of 
competition in the market.  The dispute resolution process is efficient and removes the 
unnecessary bureaucratic delays.  The next chapter details how this allocation scheme 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Fifty years ago, Ronald Coase changed the debate about spectrum allocation by 
introducing the idea of applying property-rights to spectrum allocation.  Since then, 
proponents have almost overwhelmingly agreed that the best way to allocate spectrum 
would be through exclusive-use property-rights; however, the discussion about how to 
implement a property-rights scheme is still being argued.  Although it expresses the goal 
of achieving a “property-rights” approach to spectrum allocation, the government has not 
been open to the idea of turning over spectrum rights to the commercial market.  The 
FCC claims it is acting in the best interest of the public by maintaining possession of the 
airwaves since the airwaves are the property of the people of the United States.  
Additionally, current law forbids the ownership of the airwaves by private companies. 
By leasing the airwaves, both sides of the regulation debate are satisfied.  
Leaseholders possess the flexibility to make use-agreements as they would with the 
establishment of “exclusive-use” property-rights.  Yet, the government retains possession 
of the airwaves for the purpose of repossession of defaulted leases, redistribution of the 
lease, and interference protection of government allocated spectrum.  The lease cycle 
introduces more competition into the market than a simple property-rights model.  The 
leaseholders will compete not only with each other to make the best use of their leased 
band of spectrum, but also will compete against outside investors who desire to make 
better use of the available medium. 
The administrative system established in the lease allocation scheme removes 
most of the bureaucratic restraints currently hindering progress in the wireless 
communications industry.  Such an established agency would need to lack the 
concentration of power that the FCC currently enjoys.  In the new lease-rights scheme, 
the Judicial System enforces decisions only after an efficient dispute resolution process 
that encourages cooperation amongst leaseholders.  The administrative system removes 
the unnecessary bureaucratic restraints in allocating spectrum while establishing an 
efficient method to protect against interference. 
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The initial goals of this project were to study the current situation in spectrum 
allocation, research proposals for improved allocations schemes, and provide a model for 
a more efficient system of allocating spectrum that promotes innovation.  This chapter 
describes the advantages of a spectrum lease-rights scheme over the current form of 
wireless spectrum regulation and focuses on three areas: improving physical and 
administrative efficiency; establishing a confident wireless communications market; and 
increasing the amount of competition in the marketplace.  The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of ideas that were identified during this project for future research in 
improving the allocation system for the electromagnetic spectrum. 
A. COMPARISON OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME VERSUS THE CURRENT 
REGULATION SCHEME 
1. Improved Efficiency 
Coase proposed that the application of market forces to the spectrum allocation 
problem would create the most effective tool for efficient use of the available 
electromagnetic spectrum.  This proposed scheme aims to apply a more efficient scheme 
by unleashing the open-market principles and minimizing the obstacles for companies to 
access the available spectrum. 
Efficiency in the spectrum allocation debate has two separate meanings.  First, 
efficiency alludes to making better use of the available resource.  Second, the 
administrative process should not introduce any unnecessary delays to the allocation 
process. 
a. The Current System Hinders Efficient Use 
The FCC maintains the same conservative approach to spectrum use that it 
first established with initial regulations.  The same approach to treating the spectrum as 
an extremely scarce resource is used today.  Two major problems exist in today’s FCC 
regulation of the spectrum:  it uses conservative models for interference protection and 
utilizes a bureaucratic oversight structure that inhibits an efficient allocation process. 
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Currently, the FCC aims to avoid all possibilities of interference in 
transmitting through the electromagnetic spectrum.  This approach fails to consider the 
better technologies and transmission techniques that exist today and fails to make more 
efficient use of the spectrum.  Basing spectrum decisions on “the public’s interest” fails 
to take into consideration all aspects affected by allocation decisions made by the FCC. 
The bureaucratic administrative requirements associated with the FCC 
make it nearly impossible to achieve more efficiency in allocating the spectrum.  The 
current structure is not equipped to fix its own mistakes and has no incentive for the FCC 
to improve their performance.  It takes a long time for decisions to be made by the 
Commission.  Congress allowed too much power to be granted initially to the FCC and 
failed to make adequate changes in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to improve the 
performance of the FCC.   
b. Proposed System Promotes Efficiency 
The proposed lease-rights system addresses both problems with the 
current form of spectrum regulation.  It transfers responsibility for efficient allocation to 
the open market and eliminates the role of the FCC in allocating the electromagnetic 
spectrum. 
The proposal falls short of establishing full property-rights in spectrum 
use, but takes advantage of all the benefits of a rights proposal by granting full flexibility 
to leaseholders.  The innovative use of leases maintains possession of the spectrum with 
the government but frees the leaseholders to make secondary agreements and minimizes 
the restrictions on use of the leased asset.  It establishes minimal restrictions in order to 
provide interference protection in an effective wireless communications market. 
Major decisions regarding spectrum use are removed from the FCC and 
the government.  The spacing of frequencies is not determined by an overly conservative 




agency is established for oversight of the scheme, but with no enforcement power.  Their 
role is to administer the scheme and advise in interference resolution disputes with 
established time requirements. 
The proposed system of leasing introduces a unique form of competition 
into the market for spectrum.  Leaseholders are granted use of the spectrum for fifteen 
years before it is auctioned again.  This provides more incentive for the leaseholders to 
not only make the best use of his lease, but ensures fair market value is reevaluated 
periodically.  This competitive process ensures the spectrum use is based on realistic 
technical and economic analysis.  The best manner to allocate spectrum is not by an 
unmotivated bureaucratic agency but by the leaseholders granted flexibility to use their 
asset in a highly competitive market. 
2. Establishing a More Confident Market 
In a recent legal analysis of the property-rights allocation scheme for spectrum, 
Philip Weiser and Dale Hatfield present an interesting analysis of how the scheme can 
create a loss of confidence and failure of a property-rights allocation scheme.  They 
contend that a property-rights system can only be effective if interference is avoided.187  
Additionally, they contend that a strictly Coasian approach would create opportunities for 
people to exploit the system for personal gain.  Their answer to these concerns is to 
propose a predictive modeling system to be implemented by the FCC in order to 
eliminate interference. 
This proposal presented by this thesis utilizes a different approach than proposed 
by Weiser and Hatfield.  It creates a system of competitive entry and a streamlined 
dispute process.  An administrative body provides advice in dispute resolution.  
Judgments are based on technical and economic analysis of the system by the judicial 
system.  It establishes confidence by eliminating unwarranted external influence through 
a rapid and fair dispute resolution process. 
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a. Lack of Confidence in the Current Regulation 
Throughout the existence of the FCC, numerous examples show its 
susceptibility to external influences from powerful lobbies and politicians.  Their 
decision-making has not been consistent and can only be described as ad hoc. 
b. Proposed Scheme Restores Confidence in Spectrum Allocation 
The allocation process, through fair auctions of leases, eliminates the 
impact of external influence in the allocation process.  The leases are available to the 
winning bidders who then can allocate their spectrum as they desire.  The lease system 
encourages the leaseholders to make the most effective use of their allocated spectrum.  
Since there is no bureaucratic agency with power to enforce in this scheme, the political 
and lobby influence is minimized.  Additionally, it restores the importance of the judicial 
system in the allocation oversight to resolve issues in interference disputes. 
3. Increased Competition 
In several studies, Thomas Hazlett, a former Chief Economist at the FCC, 
presents overwhelming evidence that the full value of the spectrum has yet to be found.  
Full implementation of a property-rights scheme, a stated objective of the FCC’s own 
SPTF, has not been fully incorporated into today’s policies.  The FCC is shifting towards 
allocating more of the spectrum for unlicensed use based on flawed analysis of the 
economic impact of unlicensed bands.188  “In shared bands, just providing technical and 
service flexibility would not create the correct incentives for economically efficient use 
of the spectrum, because licensees can not capture the benefits from deploying the 
spectrum-conserving equipment.”189  Current policies fall short of taking full advantage 
of a competitive market in the electromagnetic spectrum.  This proposal herein allows for 
further advancement towards a property-rights model.  It falls short of granting full 
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property-rights to license holders, but allows for the all the economic and technical 
advantages of a fully implemented property-rights model. 
a. Current Lack of Competition 
The current form of spectrum regulation provides more competition than it 
ever has done but fails to take full advantage of the benefits of competitive forces in an 
allocation scheme.  The current market has competition by attaining licenses from 
auction and by competition in the unlicensed bands.  However, there are no performance 
incentives for current license-holders to make the most efficient use of their asset.  
The FCC claims that unlicensed spectrum introduces competition for 
competing technologies in the marketplace.  There is competition, but under operating 
parameters established by the FCC that limits the amount of competition that can actually 
be introduced into the marketplace.  The FCC has taken some steps towards a property-
based system of spectrum allocation but has failed to eliminate all unnecessary barriers 
induced by restrictive regulation. 
b. Increased Competition in the Market 
The system of allocation introduced in this proposal maximizes the 
amount of competition in the spectrum market.  It creates a competitive market through 
auction of the initial lease, freedom to use their lease as desired and compete with other 
leaseholders in the wireless communications market, and re-evaluation of the asset every 
fifteen years to ensure maximum efficient use of the physical spectrum. 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
There is little doubt that the current FCC regulation of the wireless spectrum 
requires major changes.  The spectral-lease scheme provides the opportunity to 
implement an allocation scheme that can keep pace with the growth of technology.  For 
fifty years, numerous people have made proposals for improving the use of the physical 
spectrum through a more efficient allocation scheme.  The problem remains today: the 
FCC is not capable of keeping up with the pace of technology and use of the spectrum is 
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still largely driven by regulators’ decisions and not through market forces.  The overall 
problem with the current method of implementation is that the physical resource is not 
being used efficiently, the result of spectrum that is not allocated effectively or 
efficiently. 
There are several areas warranting further research in order to continue this study.  
The first is to look at the physical parameters of the lease scheme.  The second is to take a 
look at improving spectrum efficiency.  The third area recommended for further research 
by this author is the legal aspects associated with a spectrum lease allocation scheme. 
1. Physical Lease Parameters 
Further study needs to be done regarding the optimal assigned properties of a 
lease.  Two questions are readily apparent:  “How much spectrum is needed in order to 
implement current technologies?”  “With the current allocation scenario, what are the 
ideal operating characteristics of a spectrum lease?”  This scheme proposes that the leases 
cover the entire geographic area of the United States, the spectrum blocks be broken into 
equal sized 100 MHz chunks of spectrum, and that the duration of leases last fifteen 
years.  There are technical, business, and legal aspects that can be looked into for the best 
method of assigning properties for each lease.  In order to create an allocation scheme 
that promotes efficiency and innovation, the lease parameters need to be studied to 
determine how to best employ the lease allocation scheme. 
2. Spectrum Efficiency 
The electromagnetic spectrum is a finite resource.  Rapidly advancing 
technologies and demand for wireless devices create an interesting dilemma in spectrum 
allocation: you cannot create more spectrum.  Therefore, it is not only important that an 
allocation system be implemented in order to increase competition in the marketplace, 
but further investigation into the technologies and communication protocols is required in 




question:  “If in possession of a chunk of spectrum, what technologies and 
implementation techniques would allow for the maximum use of a fixed amount of 
spectrum?” 
3. Legal Aspects of a Lease Allocation Scheme 
This proposal establishes a new agency for allocating spectrum.  The idea is to 
create, from scratch, an organization that implements an effective spectrum allocation 
scheme without hindering the process.  This proposal requires administrative efforts to 
establish leases and rules associated with those leases, allocate the leases, and provide 
technical advice in the dispute resolution process.  There are legal aspects to analyze in 
order to create an effective spectrum lease allocation scheme.  “Is the current method of 
auction acceptable in order to allocate leases in the fairest possible manner?”  “Where 
might possible loopholes exist for people to exploit the allocation scheme for their 
personal benefit and how do you close them?”  “As an advisor to the Judicial Branch in 
highly technical manners, what set of rules would be needed to ensure the system is fair 
to all parties?”  Weiser and Hatfield asserted that any allocation scheme needed to 
maintain a confident market.  Efforts to liberalize other markets have failed because of 
vague or incomplete rules for implementation.  In order to ensure a successful re-
allocation of spectrum, the system must be fair and minimize the ability for personal 
exploitation of the market. 
This right of a sovereign government to manage its spectrum resources is clear.  
However, its methodology for doing so must encourage the development of free market 
competition and the advancement of novel, emerging technologies that make the most 
beneficial use of that spectrum for the good of society.  This thesis proposed a means for 
the government to maintain its ownership of its spectrum resources while ensuring the 
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